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Abstract 
In 1997, the Balance Budget Act (BBA) was implemented to slow future Medicare 
expenditure growth by eliminating or limiting inflation updating factor and other adjustments to 
inpatient diagnosis-related group (DRG) payments in the subsequent fiscal years. It is widely 
concerned whether a hospital would engage in cost shifting as response to the Medicare 
reimbursement cut. In addition, there are also great concerns about whether the quality of health 
service would deteriorate in hospitals because of the increasing financial pressures by the BBA 
of 1997. 
In this study I utilize the long-difference model to examine the evidence of cost shifting 
during the period of 1998 to 2002, given the exogenous payment cuts by the BBA of 1997. I 
further examine the possible impacts of the BBA of 1997 on health outcomes in terms of the 
Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) rate.  
I find that during the study period, hospitals on average were able to shift the expected 
revenue loss of BBA to private patient primarily on a one-dollar-to-one-dollar basis. It appears 
that hospitals shifted most cost during the first three years after the implementation of the BBA 
of 1997, whereas the cost shifting during the period of 2001 to 2002 was not statistically 
significant. I also find that the greater financial distress hospitals had the more cost-shifting they 
did. In addition, the results based on the Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) rate suggest that the 
BBA of 1997 has no significant impact on the Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) rate. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Since Medicare with “retrospective cost-based reimbursement” system was established in 1965, 
Medicare’s hospital costs have dramatically increased. The annual Medicare costs rose from $3 
billion in 1967 to $37 billion 1998.1 Medicare accounts for a large share of the federal fiscal 
budget. In 2010, three health insurance programs — Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) — sum up to $753 billion, altogether accounting for 21% of 
the federal fiscal budget. Further, nearly two-thirds of this amount, or $468 billion, goes to 
Medicare, which provides health coverage to around 46 million people who are over the age of 
65 or have disabilities (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2010). 
During the past two decades, the Congress has been trying various ways to control the 
rising Medicare expenditure. In 1982, the Congress implemented a prospective payment system 
(PPS), which pays hospital a fixed flat rate for each Diagnosis-related group (DRG). In 1997, 
Balance Budget Act (BBA) was implemented to slow future Medicare expenditure growth by 
eliminating or limiting inflation updating and other adjustments to inpatient diagnosis-related 
group (DRG) payments in subsequent fiscal years. Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 created 
the most substantial reductions in Medicare payments to hospitals since the introduction of the 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) (Newhouse 2002). 
The Congressional Budget Office (1999) estimated that the BBA totally saved $112 
billion from Medicare program during the period of 1998 to 2002. The savings from all hospital 
                                                             
1  U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Office of Inspector, General Office of Evaluation and 
Inspections. 2001. “Medicare Hospital Prospective Payment System”. http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-
00200.pdf (last access: Aug. 13, 2010). 
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Medicare reimbursement2 was estimated to be about $72 billion for the period of 1998 to 2002 
and $119 billion for the period of 1998 to 2004 (Heiber-White 1997). Even though the 1999 
Balanced Budget Refinement Act and the 2000 Benefits Improvement and Protection Act 
subsequently relaxed or delayed several original BBA provisions and were estimated to restore 
about $21 billion (or 17.6%) of reimbursement cut for the period of 1998 to 2004, the financial 
pressures brought to PPS hospitals by BBA of 1997 were still substantial (Bazzoli 2004). 
Facing the substantial reimbursement cut by a major public payer, hospitals have a 
variety of choices when making response decisions. Hospitals may manage to become more 
efficient and absorb the major part of the reimbursement cut. Hospitals may choose to accept 
fewer patients with public payer or reduce the medical service provided to this group of patients 
or all of their patients. Apart from all of these possibilities, hospitals may also engage in “cost 
shifting. 
In this study, cost shifting is defined as the phenomenon in which changes in 
administered prices of one payer lead to compensating changes in prices that are charged to other 
payers. In other words, a hospital shifts the loss due to the price cut by a public payer to private 
payers, by raising the price charged to privately insured patients. Cost shifting is different from 
price discrimination. These two concepts can be differentiated from the following ways. First of 
all, cost shifting is a dynamic phenomenon, while price discrimination is static one. Cost shifting 
is not due to the different price elasticities of the payers. When cost shifting occurs, reductions in 
payment rates by a public payer are dynamically associated with increases in the rates charged to 
                                                             
2 Medicare reimbursement includes the payment for inpatient, medical education and DSH adjustments, capital 
payments, outpatient, home health, and nursing home services. 
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privately insured patients (Morrisey 2003, Ginsburg 2003). However, when health care providers 
practice price discrimination, they may charge a payer with inelastic demand a higher price. 
Different prices for public and private payers may be observed as results of price discrimination 
strategies, but those price differences are static artifacts of having some degree of market power, 
rather than dynamic changes of prices. Additionally, we can also differentiate price 
discrimination from cost shifting from the motivation of practice. Price discrimination is 
motivated by utilizing inelasticities of demand to increase producer’s profit, while cost shifting is 
motivated by the additional constraint on revenue imposed by prospective payment for some, but 
not all, patients (Friesner & Rosenman 2002). In other words, cost shifting is usually motivated 
by reducing hospitals’ financial loss caused by public payers’ reimbursement cut policy. 
There has been a debate about whether hospitals actually do cost shifting in practice since 
1980s (Morrisey 1994). The controversy arose again after Levit et al (2004) reported a close 
timing association between the growth of medical care spending and the BBA of 1997. Some 
researchers doubted that hospitals could still do cost shifting under the PPS system in a 
competitive market environment (Lee et al 2003), while other researchers believed that cost 
shifting was likely to be more pronounced than was the case in the 1990s (Ginsburg 2003).  
Cost shifting is a policy issue of importance, because cost shifting is a dynamic response 
and decides who eventually bears the cost of medical expenditure. If many hospitals tend to shift 
losses to private payers by increasing the payment, the cost of private payers will increase and 
private payers will in turn pass on the increased cost to the working population by charging 
higher premiums. Eventually, the initial policy change does nothing to reduce the real cost of 
health care. In fact, cost shifting may also cause an increase in the uninsured population because 
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some healthy individuals may drop out of their health insurance plan when facing an increasing 
premium. A larger uninsured population may in long term bring a higher rate of hospital 
utilization, especially readmission after discharge, due to lack of preventive health care (Fuchs 
2009). In this way public health care expenditure reducing policies eventually cannot reach their 
initial goals, but may even reduce the social welfare by increasing the uninsured population. 
While a direct test of cost shifting looks at the effect of government price reductions on 
the prices charged to private patients, an indirect test of cost shifting would look at the effect of 
health care service volume and quality. There are great concerns whether the BBA of 1997 has 
substantial negative impacts on the quality of healthcare service. If hospitals responded to price 
cut with cost cutting, quality of care could be compromised to some degree, since average cost 
and quality are uniquely related and most hospitals face quality constraint and efficiency-
enhancing constraint (Zwanziger et al 2000). Deficiencies in the quality of health care are often 
found when hospitals are in financial difficulties or experience financial stress (Shen 2003, 
Seshamani, Zhu & Volpp 2006). In either case of cost shifting or cost cutting, it is still important 
to understand whether the price cut by the BBA of 1997 adversely affect the health care service 
quality. 
A large volume of research has examined hospital cost shifting since the 1980, using the 
exogenous financial impact imposed by the introduction of PPS (Morrisey 1994), however, there 
is few empirical research on hospitals’ cost shifting after the BBA of 1997 in the dramatically 
changing hospital market environment (Frakt 2011, Wu 2010). Additionally, existing research of 
hospital cost shifting focus on the industry organizational aspect, or in other words, the market 
power of hospitals (Morrisey 2003).  
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This study examines whether hospitals did cost shifting during the period of 1998 to 2002 
by analyzing how the private patient price changed given the exogenous payment cuts by the 
BBA of 1997. I further examine the possible impacts of the BBA of 1997 on the Hospital 
Acquired Infection (HAI) rate. This study may contribute to the literature in several aspects. 
Firstly, the literature on cost shifting due to the BBA of 1997 was updated by analyzing how the 
private price changed during each year from 1998 to 2002, whereas previous studies only looked 
at one difference period from 1996 and 2000 (Wu 2010). Secondly, the heterogeneity in cost 
shifting by hospital financial distress status was analyzed, which enriches understanding of why 
hospitals get engaged in cost-shifting. Thirdly, the HAI rate is a better health service quality 
measurement than the mortality of Acute Myocardial Infarction patients in most current literature 
(Wu & Shen 2011, Volpp et al 2005, Seshamani, Schwartz & Volpp 2006), because the HAI rate 
is not subject to the potential “Window Dressing” effect and can well reflect the overall 
operation and management in a hospital. 
This rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the Medicare and 
Prospective Payment System (PPS), under which BBA of 1997 was introduced and changed the 
way how the PPS payment was calculated. Chapter 2 also briefly describes the possible shift of 
market power between hospitals and the plans, because the market environment of hospitals 
operation observed dramatic changes during the 1990’s and hospitals’ cost shifting behaviors 
were subject to the shifts of market power. 
Chapter 3 reviews the literatures of cost shifting. The literature can be largely divided 
into theoretical models and empirical tests. I reviewed the models based on market power 
hypothesis and strategic game hypothesis regarding cost shifting in for-profit hospitals and non-
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for-profit hospitals. The empirical method of testing cost shifting plays an important role in 
finding cost shifting evidence, and therefore is a central issue among the literature. In Chapter 3, 
I followed the standards set by Morrisey (1994) and Frakt (2011), and categorized the empirical 
methods of testing cost shifting into three types, namely cross-sectional studies, fixed-effect 
models, and long-difference models. Apart from the changes in private price upon the price cut 
by public payer, the changes in health outcome or in health care quality are also considered as 
indirect evidence of cost shifting. 
Chapter 4 briefly describes the datasets used in this study. The major data source for 
constructing the BBA Financial Impact Index and analyzing cost shifting is from Healthcare 
Cost Report Information System (HCRIS) maintained by the Center of Medicare and Medicaid 
Service (CMS). I used the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) dataset 
to examine the health outcome in terms of the Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI), using 
occurrence rate of sepsis and pneumonia associated with invasive surgical procedures as the 
proxy. 
In Chapter 5, I found that during the period of 1996 to 2002, hospitals on average were 
able to shift the expected revenue loss of BBA to private patient almost on a one-dollar-to-one-
dollar basis. However, the hospitals did not shift the expected loss equally every year. It appears 
that hospitals shifted most cost during the first three years after the implementation of the BBA 
of 1997, whereas the cost shifting during the period of 2001 to 2002 was not measurable. I also 
found that while cost-shifting did not vary by ownership or teaching affiliation, hospitals with 
financial distress did more cost-shifting than those without financial distress. 
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In Chapter 6, I studied the impacts of the BBA of 1997 on health outcome. I found that 
the BBA of 1997 had no significant impact on the health outcome measured by the HAI rate. At 
last, I summarize the major finding of this study and discuss future research directions in Chapter 
7. 
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Chapter 2 Background 
2.1 Medicare and Prospective Payment System (PPS) 
Medicare is a social insurance program administered by the United States government, providing 
health insurance coverage to the persons who are aged 65 and over; to those who are under 65 
and permanently physically disabled or who have a congenital physical disability; or to those 
who meet other special criteria (Newhouse 2002). Medicare program was initially enacted 
according to the Social Security Act of 1965. The original Medicare payment system was 
designed to be a modified fee-for-service model, following the existing health insurance market 
dominated by Blue Cross-Blue Shield. Medicare reimbursed hospitals retrospectively for the 
customary, prevailing, and reasonable charges, which are defined as the lowest of the following 
charges: (1) the physician’s actual charge, (2) the physician’s customary charge (i.e., the median 
of an individual physician’s charges for a specific service within a specific time interval), or (3) 
the prevailing charge (i.e., the fee in the 90th, and later the 75th, percentile charged by specialty-
specific physicians within a Medicare payment area). Under this system of cost reimbursement, 
Medicare reimbursed hospitals for a share of their capital and labor inpatient expenses, which 
was proportionate to Medicare’s share of patient days in the hospital. This reimbursement system 
set no limits on the cost, therefore physicians were not motivated to do cost-control but had the 
incentives to raise charges, leading to a rapid increase in the program payments (Newhourse 
2002, Hariri 2007). 
In an attempt to slow the rapid growth of health care costs and Medicare spending, 
Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) was implemented in October 1983 (fiscal year 
1984) (Newhouse 2002). A Prospective Payment System is a method of reimbursement in which 
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Medicare payment is made based on a predetermined and fixed amount. PPS adopts a per-case 
reimbursement mechanism, under which inpatient admission cases are classified into relatively 
homogeneous categories called diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). For hospital care provided to 
each DRG, Medicare pays hospitals a flat rate per case. The purpose of PPS is to reward efficient 
hospitals for their efficiency and to force inefficient hospitals to become more efficient.3 
CMS uses separate PPSs for reimbursement to acute inpatient hospitals, home health 
agencies, hospice, hospital outpatient, inpatient psychiatric facilities, inpatient rehabilitation 
facilities, long-term care hospitals and skilled nursing facilities. The Social Security Act (the Act) 
establishes a system of payment for the operating costs of acute care hospital inpatient stays 
under Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) based on prospectively set rates. This payment 
system is referred to as the Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS).4  
The IPPS payment system includes the core elements as below: 
 The MS-DRG relative weights, which account for the differences in the mix of patients 
treated across hospitals. 
 The standardized amounts, which are the basic payment amounts. 
 A wage index to account for the differences in hospital labor costs. 
 An add-on payment for hospitals that serve a disproportionate share of low-income 
patients.  
                                                             
3 CMS: Medicare, Prospective Payment Systems (General Information), http://www.cms.gov/ProspMedicare 
FeeSvcPmtGen/ 
4 Acute Inpatient PPS, http://www.cms.gov/AcuteInpatientPPS/01_overview.asp#TopOfPage 
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 An add-on payment for hospitals that incur indirect costs of medical education.  
 An add-on payment for cases utilizing technologies that are approved under the new 
technology add-on payment criteria.  
 An additional payment for cases that are unusually costly, called outliers. 
The direct costs of medical education for interns and residents are paid based on a per 
resident payment amount. The following costs continue to be paid on a reasonable cost basis: 
Hospital bad debts attributable to nonpayment of the Medicare deductible and coinsurance; heart, 
liver, lung and kidney acquisition costs incurred by an approved transplant facility. 
The average Medicare prospective payment for hospital i at time t can be calculated using 
the formula5 (Research Data Assistance Center 2006) in Equation (2.1): 
PPS paymentit = [base payment rate]it × [CMI]it × [adjustments]it   (2.1) 
Where, base payment rateit = (base payment)it-1 × (1 + update factorit) 
adjustmentsit = (1 + IMEit + DSHit) × (1 + OUTit) 
IME = Indirect medical education adjustment; 
DSH = Disproportionate share adjustment; 
OUT = Expected outlier share for costs. 
                                                             
5 The formula for calculating hospital average DRG payment is based on the formula for calculating the 
hospital specific DRG payment for a single case, which is provided by Research Data Assistance Center at 
http://www.resdac.org/tools/TBs/TN-004_CalculatingHospitalDRG_508.pdf . 
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The base payment rate 
The base payment rate is comprised of a standardized amount, which is divided into a 
labor-related and non-labor share as in Equation (2.2). The labor-related share is adjusted by the 
wage index applicable to the area where the hospital is located and if the hospital is located in 
Alaska or Hawaii, the non-labor share is adjusted by a cost of living adjustment factor. 
Base payment rate = (Standardized Labor Share × Operating Wage Index) + (Standardized 
Non-Labor Share × Operating COLA Adjustment for Hospitals Located in Alaska and Hawaii) 
          (2.2) 
Since October 1, 1996, the labor-related share accounts for 71.2 % of the standardized 
amount of operating costs, while the non-labor-related portion is 28.8 %. The labor-related 
portion of the standardized amounts is decided by summing the percentages of the labor-related 
items, which include wages and salaries, employee benefits, professional fees, business services, 
computer and data processing services, postage, and all other labor-intensive services in the 
operating hospital market basket.6 
The standardized amounts are based on 1981 hospital costs per Medicare discharge that 
have been adjusted to account for differences in certain hospital costs, such as case-mix, wage 
rates and any additional payment received for disproportionate share status (DSH) and indirect 
medical education (IME).  
                                                             
6 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 168 / Friday, August 29, 1997 / Rules and Regulations, pp 45995. 
13 
 
The base year costs are increased by an update factor (commonly known as the inpatient 
hospital market basket) for every year since 1981. These update factors are set by the Congress, 
and are intended to account for annual inflation while maintaining incentives for hospitals to be 
efficient. Under current laws, hospitals that do not report hospital quality data are subject to a 
reduced update factor. 
Case Mix Index (CMI) 
Case Mix Index (CMI) is constructed to measure the average DRG relative weight7  for a 
hospital. A hospital’s CMI is calculated by summing the DRG weights for all Medicare 
discharges and dividing by the number of discharges. CMI is one of the most commonly used 
indicators of the intensity of hospital resource utilization in health services research. On the basis 
of transfer adjustment, CMI can be classified into transfer-adjusted and unadjusted cases. Since 
1998 CMS has started compute Final Rule Case Mix Index and updated it annually in Final Rule 
of the IPPS. 
Hospital market basket 
                                                             
7 Under the IPPS, each case is categorized into a diagnosis-related group (DRG). Each DRG has a payment 
weight assigned to it, based on the average resources used to treat Medicare patients in that DRG. Hospitals 
submit a bill for each Medicare patient they treat to their Medicare fiscal intermediary (a private insurance 
company that contracts with Medicare to carry out the operational functions of the Medicare program). Based 
on the information provided on the bill, the case is categorized into a Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related 
Group (MS-DRG), which determines how much payment the hospital receives. 
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The hospital ‘‘market basket’’ refers to the hospital input price index, which is the 
inflation component update factor for operating costs of hospitals. 8  The market basket 
composites cost category weights and price proxies based on the mix of goods and services used 
to produce hospital care. The basket includes four major expense categories, namely, wages and 
salaries, employee benefits, pharmaceuticals, and a residual category. Since fiscal year 1997, the 
market basket’s cost structure was rebased from FY 1987 to FY 1992.9 The data of major 
expense categories are from Medicare hospital cost reports for the periods beginning in FY 1992. 
(The fiscal year 1992 begins on or after October 1, 1991 and ends before October 1, 1992.)  
Wage Index 
The wage index is an adjustment factor to reflect area differences in hospital wage levels. 
The wage index indicates the relative hospital wage level in the geographic area of the hospital 
compared to the national average hospital wage level. 
            =  
        ′                     
                                
                        (2.3) 
A labor market area's wage index value is the ratio of the area's average hourly wage to 
the national average hourly wage.10 And the wage index adjustment factor is applied only to the 
                                                             
8 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 168 / Friday, August 29, 1997 / Rules and Regulations, pp45993 (Final Rule: 
FY1998 Changes to the hospital IPPS). 
9 Rebasing means moving the base year for the structure of costs of an input price index. Revising means 
changing data sources, cost categories, or price proxies used in the input price index for a given base year. 
10 Average hourly wage for each labor market area = total wage costs/total hours for all hospitals in the 
geographic area. National average hourly wage= total wage costs/total hours for all hospitals in the nation. 
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labor portion of the standardized amounts. The wage index is updated annually on the basis of a 
survey of wages and wage-related costs of short-term, acute care hospitals. CMS derives the 
wage index using data from the Medicare Cost Report, the Hospital Wage Index Occupational 
Mix Survey, hospitals' payroll records, contracts, and other wage-related documentation. 
Currently hospital geographic areas (labor market areas) are defined on the basis of Core-
Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs), which were established by the Office of Management and 
Budget and announced in December 2003. 
Disproportionate Share Adjustment (DSH) 
Disproportionate share hospital (DSH) adjustment is an add-on payment applied to the 
DRG-adjusted base payment rate for hospitals that are qualified the condition of treating a high-
percentage of low-income patients. There are two statutory formulas designed to identify 
hospitals that serve a disproportionate share of low-income patients, namely, (1) DSH-patient-
percentage method and (2) special-exception method. 
The primary method is DSH-patient-percentage method, which is based on a formula that 
results in the DSH patient percentage. The DSH patient percentage, as shown in Equation (2.4), 
is equal to the sum of the percentage of Medicare inpatient days attributable to patients eligible 
for both Medicare Part A and Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the percentage of total 
inpatient days attributable to patients eligible for Medicaid by not Medicare Part A.  
DSH Patient Percent = (Medicare Supplemental Security Income Days / Total Medicare 
Days) + (Medicaid, Non-Medicare Days / Total Patient Days)    (2.4) 
16 
 
Medicare Supplemental Security Income Days are the hospital patient days used by 
patients who were entitled to both Medicare Part A and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 
Total Medicare Days are patient days used by patients under Medicare Part A for that same 
period. Medicaid, Non-Medicare Days includes hospital patient days used by patients who were 
eligible for medical assistance under a state plan approved under title XIX (Medicaid), but who 
were not entitled to Medicare Part A. Total patient days are the total number of hospital patient 
days for that same period. 
The alternate special exception method is for large urban hospitals that can demonstrate 
that more than 30% of their total net inpatient care revenues come from the State and local 
governments for indigent care (other than Medicare or Medicaid). Hospitals whose DSH patient 
percentage exceeds 15% are eligible for a DSH payment adjustment based on another statutory 
formula.11 
Indirect medical education adjustment (IME) 
IME is an added-on designed to reflect the higher patient care costs of teaching hospitals 
relative to non-teaching hospitals. An approved teaching hospital, which has residents in an 
approved graduate medical education program, receives indirect medical education adjustment. 
Under the IPPS, IME adjustment for operating costs depends on the ratio of residents-to-beds 
and for capital costs on the ratio of residents-to-average daily census. 
The teaching IME adjustment to DRG payments is calculated as in Equation (2.5) 
                                                             
11 The formula varies for urban hospitals with 100 or more beds and rural hospitals with 500 or more beds, 
hospital that qualify as rural referral centers or sole community hospitals, and other hospitals. 
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IME percentage = c × [(1+ r)0.405 - 1]    (2.5) 
Where c is a multiplier that is set by the Congress and has been subject to change in 
different legislation, and r is hospital’s resident-to-bed ratio. Thus, the amount of IME payment 
that a hospital receives is dependent upon the number of residents the hospital trains and the 
current level of the IME multiplier. Based on the computing formula, IME percentage is 
traditionally interpreted as a certain percentage increase in payment for every 10% increase in 
the resident-to-bed ratio.  
Outlier payment (OUT) 
In addition to the basic prospective payments, outlier payment is made for outlier cases, 
which are some particular cases and incur extraordinarily high costs. To qualify for outlier 
payments, a case must have costs exceeding a fixed-loss outlier threshold amount. CMS 
publishes the outlier threshold in the annual Inpatient Prospective Payment System (IPPS) Final 
Rule. For Federal fiscal year (FY) 2005, the existing fixed-loss outlier threshold was $25,800. 
The qualifying factors of outlier payment include operating cost, capital costs and DRG 
payments. The operating and capital costs are computed by multiplying the total covered charges 
by the operating and capital cost-to-charge ratios, respectively. Outlier payments are then made 
based on a marginal cost factor equal to 80% of the combined operating and capital costs in 
excess of the fixed-loss threshold (90% for burn DRGs).The thresholds are also area-wage-
index-adjusted. 
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2.2 The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 
The Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997 tried to exercise cost-containment in Medicare in 
various ways and made many changes to the Medicare reimbursement policies. It affected all 
core factors of Medicare payments for hospital inpatient services under the prospective payment 
systems. 
1) Hospital operating payment update factor 
The BBA of 1997 tried to slow down the growth of medical expenditures by reducing the 
update factor of the standardized amount in the base payment. It ruled that the applicable 
percentage change in the standardized amounts was 0% for FY 1998, the market basket 
percentage increase minus 1.9 percentage points for all hospitals in all areas for FY 1999, the 
market basket percentage increase minus 1.8 percentage points for hospitals in all areas for FY 
2000, the market basket percentage increase minus 1.1 percentage points for hospitals for all 
areas for FYs 2001 and 2002, and the market basket percentage increase for hospitals in all areas 
for FY 2003 and subsequent fiscal years.12  
2) Disproportionate Share Payments 
BBA reduce the DSH payments by 1 %; 2 % for October 1, 1998; 3 % for October 1, 
1999; 3 % for October 1, 2000 through March 31, 2001; 1 % for April 1, 2001 through 
September 30, 2001; 3 % for October 1, 2001 through September 30, 2002; and 0 % thereafter.13 
                                                             
12 BBA of 1997, Section 4401(a). 
13 BBA of 1997, Section 4403; HICRS Pr2_3630 Manual. 
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3) Indirect Medical Education 
The BBA reduced the level of the IME multiplier over a 4-year period, because there was 
a concern that the IME adjustment overpaid hospitals relative to their additional teaching costs. 
The BBA revised the IME formula to reduce the IME adjustment factor from 7.7 % to 7.0 % in 
FY 1998, 6.5 % in FY 1999, 6.0 % in FY 2000, and 5.5 % in FY 2001 and subsequent fiscal 
years.14 However, the Balanced Budget Refinement Act (BBRA) of 1999 Reforms slowed the 
transition set by the BBA for the IME adjustment factor. For FY 2000, special payments were 
made to each hospital to maintain the IME factor at 6.5 %. For FY 2001, the factor increased to 
6.25 %. The implementation of the factor at 5.5 % was delayed until FY 2002. 
Benefits Improvement and Protection Act (BIPA) of 2000 Reforms changed the IME 
payment add-on for FY 2001 to 6.25 % for discharges occurring on October 1, 2000 and before 
April 1, 2001, and to 6.75 % for discharges occurring after April 1, 2001 and before October 1, 
2001. The IME adjustment was 6.5 % in FY 2002 and 5.5 % in FY 2003 and subsequent years.  
Beginning in FY 1998, IME and DSH payments was made on the base of DRG payment 
rates rather than outlier payments. The IME formula was revised to reduce the IME adjustment 
factor from 7.7 % to 7.0 % in FY 1998, 6.5 % in FY 1999, 6.0 % in FY 2000, and 5.5 % in FY 
2001 and subsequent fiscal years. Or, on or after October 1, 1988, and before October 1, 1997, 
‘c’ (the IME multiplier in the formula) is set to be 1.89, 1.72 for fiscal year 1998, 1.6 for fiscal 
year 1999, 1.47 for fiscal year 2000, and 1.35 for fiscal year 2001 and after. In Table 2-1 I 
                                                             
14BBA of 1997, Section 4621(a). 
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summarize the actual IME multipliers hospitals received, which have reflected the amendments 
by BBRA and BIPA. 
4) Outlier Payments 
In determining outlier payments, the fixed loss cost outlier threshold will encompass 
payments for IME and DSH (Section 4405). BBA changed the formula of calculating outlier 
payment in two ways. First, BBA rules that the IME and DSH adjustment factors are applied 
only to the base DRG payment, rather than the sum of the base DRG payment and any cost 
outlier payments. Second, BBA requires that the fixed loss cost outlier threshold is based on the 
sum of DRG payments and IME and DSH payments for purposes of comparing costs to 
payments. Thus, 
Before the Change of BBA 
Standard Cost = Billed Charges Cost to Charge Ratio × (1 + IME + DSH) 
Outlier Payments = 80% × Standard Cost Threshold × (1 +IME + DSH) 
Total Payments = (Outlier Payments +Federal Rate) × (1 + IME + DSH) 
After the Change of BBA 
Standard Cost = Billed Charges × Cost to Charge Ratio 
Outlier Payments = 80% × Standard Cost Threshold 
Total Payments = Federal Rate × (1 + IME + DSH) +Outlier Payments 
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As indicated above, the BBA of 1997 changes the calculation of outliers’ payment in the 
following ways:  
First, in the old formula, the standard cost is adjusted downward by “1 + IME + DSH” to 
reflect the IME and DSH adjustments that hospitals already received. The BBA of 1997 will not 
standardize the costs of the case to account for IME and DSH payments. Therefore, an IME-and-
DSH hospital and a Non-IME-and-DSH hospital will face the same standard cost, and an IME-
and-DSH hospital has a higher standard cost than before. Second, BBA took IME and DSH 
adjustment out of the outlier payment .Given the same standard cost and threshold, the outlier 
payment after the change of BBA would be smaller than before. Under the new method, the 
outlier threshold also increases for all hospitals. Third, BBA outlier payment is distracted from 
the base payment when calculating the total payment. 
It is possible that the impact of changes on the outlier payment might be heterogeneous 
given hospitals’ IME and DSH status. Final Rule FY 1998 shows a numerical example, in which 
outlier payment in an IME-and-DSH hospital increases by 1.1% from $51043.96 to $51592.13, 
whereas outlier payment in a non-IME-and-DSH hospital decreases by 1.9% from $52207.19 to 
$51210.24. However, in this example CMS did not take into consideration the impact on the total 
payment due to taking outlier payment out of the base payment.15 In the case that the majority of 
hospitals under the PPS system are non-IME-and-DSH hospitals, the net effect of the changes of 
outlier payment will be reducing the total payment. 
                                                             
15 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 168 / Friday, August 29, 1997 / Rules and Regulations, pp 45997. 
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In addition, BBA tried to remove hospitals’ financial incentives to lower cost by 
substituting hospital stay with post-acute services. BBA chose ten DRGS with high use of post-
acute services and modified the DRG payment for patients who were discharged relatively 
sooner than the mean length of stay and used post-acute services. 
2.3 Shifting of Market Power: Hospitals verses Managed Care 
Many economists believe that cost shifting is a symptom of market power by hospitals (Morrisey 
2003). The major feature of market environment in the late 1990s and early 2000s is 
characterized by the shifting of market power between hospitals and managed care plans. Market 
power is defined as the degree of control or influence that an organization has over another 
organization (Devers 2003). In other words, whether a hospital can actually do cost shifting 
depends on how much market power this hospital has over the private insurance payers. During 
the 1990s and early 2000s with different growth stages of HMO enrollment, there were shifts of 
market power between hospitals and healthcare management organizations. This section briefly 
reviews three stages of the market power shifts between hospitals and HMOs during the 1990s 
and early 2000s. 
“Contract taker” hospitals during 1990-1996 
During the rising era of managed care from 1992 to1997, managed care plans using 
selective contracting strategy obtained some degree of market power from hospitals. In the early 
1990s, HMO enrollees grew from 3 million in 1970 to the peak of over 80 million in 1999. This 
increase equated to a 12 % increase every single year, and the national enrollment grew every 
single year during this period as well. By 1995, survey results show that managed care covered 
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nearly 75% of insured working Americans. Even small employers are switching to managed care 
(Jensen 1997). Selective contracting was one of the major innovations of managed care that 
changed competitive dynamics in the hospital sector and increased plans' negotiating leverage 
with hospitals. Under selective contracting, plans would contract with a subset of hospitals in the 
market and, through a variety of techniques, strongly encourage physicians and members to only 
utilize those facilities.  
Facing the selective contracting strategies by the insurance plans, hospitals found it 
difficult to do cost shifting for several reasons. First, the priority of a hospital’s surviving 
strategy was to secure a contract with a plan and to secure large blocks of patients channeled by 
the plans. Second, the competition between hospitals had evolved from the arm-race or the 
equipment-and-quality competition in the 1980s and become a price-oriented one. Prices played 
a larger role in the hospital competition because purchasers of the plans usually were employers 
rather than patients per see. These employer plan-purchasers were more price-sensitive than 
individual insures were. And they also can push insurance plans hard to negotiate with hospitals 
for better terms, especially lower payment rates with hospitals. Additionally, managed care also 
acquired a certain portion of the market power through exercising utilization review and 
management, hospitalization length reduction, or shifting to outpatient. As the results of selective 
contracting strategy, hospitals may subject to a relative oversupply of hospital beds and this 
excess capacity further enhanced plans negotiation power of threatening to switching large group 
of patients from one hospital to another. Most hospitals became “contract takers” during 1990-
1996 and the market power was largely shifted to the plans (Devers et al 2003). 
Backlash against Managed Care in late 1990s and early 2000s 
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With the rapid growth of managed care, a managed care backlash, which is a collective 
behavioral response led by attacks from threatened professional, provider, and special interest, 
became widely shared in the health policy community (Havighurst 2001). Because many 
managed care health plans were provided by for-profit companies, their cost-control efforts 
created widespread perception that they were more interested in saving money than providing 
health care. These public perceptions have been fairly consistent in polling since 1997. The 
backlash included vocal critics, including disgruntled patients and consumer-advocacy groups, 
who argued that managed care plans were controlling costs by denying medically necessary 
services to patients, even in life-threatening situations, or by providing low-quality care 
(Mechanic 2004, Blendon 1998). The Patient's Bill of Rights was passed by the United States 
Congress in 1998. Many states passed laws mandating managed-care standards and weakening 
the plans' negotiating leverage with hospitals. During the late 1990s, due to a tight labor market 
and rising corporate profits, employers no longer pushed hard to control health plan but took the 
strategy of retaining employees by maintaining or improving their health insurance benefits. 
In early 2000 there were some signs that plans were losing market powers. First, plans 
became less selective contracting, emphasizing wide geographic coverage and having more 
providers in their networks to increase the attractiveness to purchasers and consumers. A survey 
of Managed Care plans in 2000-2001 revealed that many plans set no rule to exclude providers 
from their networks (Devers et al 2003). Since the selective-contracting strategy of plans was 
weakened, plans had lost a large portion of market power when negotiating with providers. 
Second, plans showed declining ability to channel patients to providers. Since patient channeling 
ability plays an important role in the price negotiation (Wu 2009), when providers realized that 
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managed care plans could no longer guarantee greater patient volume, they would no longer 
agree to give the price discounts as great as they used to. 
Considering the market environment featured by backlash again managed care during this 
period, Ginsburg (2003) points out that the market conditions in the late 1990s and the early 
2000s are much more favorable to cost shifting than was the case in the 1980s. Ginsburg argues 
that even though in general hospitals had less market power under managed care than before, 
some hospitals appeared to have regained some of the market power that they had lost by the 
mid-1990s. Indeed, hospitals might increase the level of consolidation, or implement physician-
integration strategies to build greater hospital–physician alignment, strengthened negotiating 
power over plans. 
Finally, the mounting financial pressure resulted from the BBA of 1997 may prompt 
hospitals to exercise their market power with private plans (Devers et al 2003). Many hospitals 
suffered greatly from the cutbacks in Medicare reimbursement rates by BBA. At the same time, 
emerging labor shortages, new technologies (including investment in information systems), and 
pharmaceuticals pushed hospital costs to even higher level. After hospital sector had been 
relatively consolidated, mounting financial pressure was believed to be one of the primary 
reasons for hospitals' more aggressive negotiating stances. 
  
26 
 
 
Table 2-1: Changes in IME calculation formula 
Formula FY94 to FY97 FY 98 FY 99 FY00 FY01 
1 1.89×[(1+r)0.405-1] 1.72×[(1+r)0.405-1] 1.6×[(1+r)0.405-1] 1.47×[(1+r)0.405-1] 1.35×[(1+r)0.405-1] 
2 7.7×R 7.0×R (BBA 97) 6.5×R (BBA 97) 6.25×R (BBRA 99) 6.5×R 
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Chapter 3 Cost Shifting Literature Review 
3.1 Theoretical models of cost shifting 
In theory, cost shifting can occur only if two conditions are met. First, the provider must have 
sufficient market power to raise prices to private payers. Second, the provider must not have 
been fully exercising that power (Morrisey 1994). Based on profit-maximization theory, cost 
shifting should not occur because a hospital with market power should be profit-maximizes, 
exercising its market power on all payers at all times. In utility-maximizing model, cost shifting 
could occur because a non-for-profit hospital may selectively exercise its market power on the 
basis of temporal financial conditions. Emphasizing the largely weakened market power of 
hospitals in a competitive market environment, “strategy models” is aimed to explain cost-
shifting as the dynamic pricing games between public payers and private payers. 
3.1.1 Market power hypothesis 
With different assumptions about hospitals’ objective function, profit-maximizing and utility 
maximizing models are used to model hospitals behaviors and lead to different conclusions 
regarding if hospitals have marketing power to do cost-shifting. 
A. Cost shifting in profit maximization model 
Hay (1983) and Foster (1985) used simple profit maximization models to examine 
theoretically the relationship of government price cut with the changes of private price given a 
certain type of economy of scale. Hay (1983) has concluded that declines in government 
reimbursement induce cost shifting only if a profit-maximizing provider incurs diseconomies of 
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scale in production. In profit maximization models, hospitals are assumed to be monopolistic 
profit-maximizers, providing identical services to both the private and government sectors. 
Because government price has been decided and does not change with volume, a profit-
maximizing hospital produces services setting the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of 
care.  
Profit-maximizing-hospital models generally suggest there are no direct correlations 
between payment cut by public payer and the price increase by private payers, because a profit-
maximizing hospital with market power has already set prices at profit-maximizing level. When 
a hospital is operating with an increasing return to scale, profit-maximizing model implies a 
lower price for private sector as the response to the public payer’s price cut. This is because a 
profit-maximizing hospital has already fully exploited its market power before the government 
price change by choosing respectively the quantity of services provided to the government 
programs and private market to maximize profits. When the public payer cut the reimbursement 
rate (the price), the hospital will reset the service quantity provided to the public sector and the 
private sector to maximize its profit. Given the lower public price, it will shift part of its capacity 
from the public patient market to private patients market. Facing a downward sloping demand 
curve in the private market, a profit-maximizing hospital has to lower the private patient price to 
realize larger utilization of the medical service. This phenomenon is called “reverse cost 
shifting” (Morrisey 1994). 
In short, in response to lower public payments, profit maximization model predicts that 
hospitals may NOT engage in dynamic cost-shifting. Instead, there will be a volume shift (lower 
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public volume, higher private volume) and a price spillover effect, or “reverse cost shifting” 
(lower private payments as well) (Foster1985, Morrisey 1994). 
Morrisey (1994) believes that profit-maximizing model is also applicable to non-for-
profit hospitals because in order to maximize resources for charitable purposes these hospitals 
can also charge profit-maximizing prices to some payers. Therefore, “reverse cost shifting” or 
no-cost-shifting response is also expected from non-for-profit hospitals that seek to maximize 
revenue in service to charitable work. 
However, non-for-profit hospitals actually are the major members of this industry, and 
many economists feel resistant to generalize the profit-maximizing model to all hospitals and to 
accept the prediction of “reverse cost shifting” or no cost shifting by appealing to a profit-
maximization assumption. Zwanziger (2000) points that the fundamental weakness of Profit-
maximizing model about hospital cost shifting lies in the assumption of profit-maximizing rules. 
Ginsburg (2003) argues that non-for-profit hospitals may not consistently maximize anything 
because they can be guided by vague missions and influenced by stakeholders with differing 
objectives. 
B. Cost shifting in non-for-profit hospitals (utility maximization) 
Instead of simple profit-maximizing model, Dranove (1988) developed a utility-
maximization model with fixed average cost across payers to analyze cost-shifting. Dranove 
incorporated Newhouse’s assumption that NFP hospitals’ utility is decided together by the 
volume of services and profits as administrators would derive benefit from institutions that were 
large and had a reputation for providing high quality. In this model, hospitals are capable of cost 
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shifting by raising prices to private payers in response to reductions in public payer payment. 
Hospital’s underutilized market power is a critical condition that enables cost shifting to occur. 
Hospitals would not do cost shifting if demand in the private sector is elastic and an increase in 
prices to private insurers would reduce hospital profits.  
On the basis of Dranove (1988) and Newhouse’s utility function for non-for-profit 
hospitals, Zwanziger et al (2000) assume that most hospitals face quality constraint and 
efficiency-enhancing constraint. Average cost and quality are uniquely related, so that cost 
cutting will compromise quality to some degree, rather than increases operational efficiency. 
This model also assumes that hospitals can adjust the average price to private payers and the 
average cost two parameters to maximize their utility. This model inferred that hospitals would 
be able to respond to external operating changes with two generic strategies: one is to adjust 
prices to their privately ensured patients, and the other is to adjust the cost (quality) level. 
Using the same utility-maximizing model, Cutler (1998) has graphically shown that both 
cost-shifting and cost cutting are possible as hospitals’ response to a public price cut. In his 
model, a hospital makes zero profits on the hospital's income from Medicare and private patients, 
but may gain "residual claimants" to finance its self-perceived mission, such as caring for the 
uninsured, teaching, research, or investment in new technologies. Hospitals value both lower 
price (charity care) to private patients and more profit available for its mission. When there is a 
Medicare payment reductions, the utility maximizing hospital will reduce both its "charity" care 
to private patients and its profits. In other words, the impacts of Medicare payment reductions on 
increasing private patient price will be observed as “cost shifting”, while the impacts on reduced 
profits, and thus the ability of the hospital to pursue its other missions, is termed “cost cutting”. 
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Cutler (1998) also indicates that hospitals in more competitive markets, with the rise of managed 
care, are facing more price elastic demand and that Medicare cuts in the market will result in 
more cost cutting and less cost shifting than in the market with less elastic demand. Cutler 
predicts that despite of the possibility, cost shifting should be less prevalent in markets where 
managed care has wide penetration and strong negotiation power. 
3.1.2 Strategic game hypothesis 
Emphasizing the important role of market power in explaining why hospital costs shift, market 
power models assume that dynamic cost-shifting is caused by the price cut of public payers. 
However, there is another group of researchers who believe that the market power of hospitals is 
probably diminishing as more and more payers adopt price-setting policies and selective hospital 
contracts (Ma & McGuire, 1993). Wu (2010) terms this group of theories as “strategy models”. 
Instead of emphasizing the role of hospital ownership or market power, strategy hypothesis tries 
to capture the dynamic pricing games between public payers and private payers. According to 
this group of models, public payers may behave strategically in setting price (intentionally set the 
price low as responses to the price setting of private payers). 
Assuming a price-taking hospital interested in profit-maximizing, Ma and McGuire 
(1993) analyze a regulatory game between a public and a private payer to finance hospital joint 
costs (mainly capital and technology expenses). To reflect the difficulty of specifying technology 
and capital cost in health care, they assume that the payments to hospitals can be based upon the 
level of joint costs ex post, but that hospitals can not be directed to adopt a level of joint costs ex 
ante. Partially reimbursing the joint costs is a feasible policy, but specifying a particular level is 
unrealistic. The public payer may both directly reimburse for joint costs (“pass-through” 
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payments) and add a margin over variable costs paid per discharge, while the private payer can 
only use a margin policy. The hospital chooses joint costs in response to payers' overall payment 
incentives. The model demonstrates that without “pass-through” payments public payer may 
under-reimburse hospital joint costs and enjoy free-riding due to the first-mover advantage. 
According to this study, cost-shifting does not depend on the market power of hospitals. Instead, 
it is decided by the public payer’s relative ability of free riding and the private payer’s ability to 
commit to a strategy, and the availability of other strategies. 
Following the same utility-maximizing hospital assumption, Glazer and McGuire (1994) 
assume that both public and private payers have to enter contracts with the hospital on the basis 
of allocated cost because the true cost per patient is not a possible basis for payment. Payers can 
set fully prospective payment system or fully retrospective fee-based payment system, or a 
mixture of these two systems. The model demonstrates that in equilibrium hospital input 
decisions are distorted by the payers’ incentives to engage in cost shifting.  
In a related research, Glazer and McGuire (2002) studied the interactions between a 
public payer (Medicare) and a private payer. The public payer sets the price as the first mover 
and takes any provider who is willing to participate. The private payer pays a price on the basis 
of quality, and a provider/plan, in the presence of shared elements of quality. Because the public 
payer has different objectives and contracting practices from a private payer, the service qualities 
desired by these two payers from the provider are believed to be different. However, the provider 
faces a challenge of “shared elements of quality”, which means that some service characteristics 
or quality by the provider can not be offered separately and have to be shared by both payers. 
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The provider compromises on quality in response to divergent incentives from payers. In this 
way, shared elements of quality provide chances of free-riding. 
According to Glazer and McGuire (2002)’s model, when Medicare is a small payer in a 
market and when it makes pricing mistakes by focusing too much on the details of its payment 
formulae with little effect on the quality of services offered by plans, private payers practice 
reasonably efficient contracting and can mitigate the mistakes by Medicare. As a result, 
Medicare initiatives of price setting will be diluted. Therefore, if Medicare behaves strategically 
by setting its prices too low and committing to a price, it can free-ride on the quality set by the 
private payer.  
Strategy hypothesis has several empirical implications. First, hospitals that largely rely on 
private payers should do little cost shifting, because the joint cost and quality level have been set 
close to the utility maximization level, or the dilution effects by private sectors will offset the 
impacts by public sector. This also implies that testing an “interaction term” of Medicare policy 
change with share of Medicare at a provider or plan level. Second, hospitals that have high 
degree of commonality in shared quality will easily do cost shifting, because hospitals can easily 
shift joint cost to private payers if the public payer strategically set the price low. However, it is 
very hard to test the second empirical implication because it is difficult to measure the degree of 
commonality in shared quality, although some researches try to check if “practice-level” 
incentives matter along with “payer-level” incentives in the behavior of providers, in order to 
check for commonality. 
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3.2 Empirical approaches and tests 
During the past twenty years there has been a debate about whether hospitals and physicians 
actually are engaged in the practice of cost shifting. The majority of empirical study about cost 
shifting focuses on empirical evidences of cost shifting and finds mixed results. Many empirical 
studies are based on the utility maximizing model and market power model hypothesis 
(Zuckerman 1987, Dranove 1988, Zwaniger 2000, Friesner & Rosenman 2002). There are few 
empirical studies aiming at testing the market power hypothesis and strategic hypothesis, or 
explaining the causes of hospital cost shifting and the heterogeneous degree of cost shifting 
except Wu (2010). 
3.2.1 The empirical models 
The empirical method of testing cost shifting plays an important role in finding cost 
shifting evidence, and therefore is a central issue among the literature. It can be classified into 
three types: 1) cross-sectional studies, 2) fixed-effect model, and 3) long-difference model 
(Morrisey 1994, Wu 2010, Frakt 2011). 
1) Cross-sectional studies 
Cross-sectional studies examine the variation of profits or payment-cost ratio across 
providers at a specific point of time. They do not include year effects or provider effects. The 
price differences captured by this model are static price phenomenon and actually are price-
discrimination in nature, rather than dynamic cost shifting, which is the variation or the changes 
across the time. In a cross sectional study, any local market-specific factors that change the 
hospital’s market power with private payers will lead to the variations in private prices 
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accordingly. For this reason, the evidences that are found in cross-sectional studies are not 
observing cost shifting per se, but price discrimination, which is the simple difference in market 
power (Morrisey 1994). 
2) Fixed-effect model 
This model applies panel data techniques to control dynamic properties of cost shifting, 
using a hospital-year level OLS model of per patient private payment with hospital and year 
fixed effects. Panel data approach estimates how private prices change due to the changes in 
public prices relative to their provider-specific means. It has become quite common in the 
literature (Friesner & Roseman 2002). 
3) Long difference model 
This approach differences out all time-invariant factors, but still keeps time-variant 
coefficient of the change. Dranove (1988)’s analysis points out potential omit-variable bias in 
empirical tests studying movements in profits. Any unobserved cross-sector profit shocks may 
cause a positively correlated movement in the profits across sectors and may bias the results 
towards no cost-shifting. By taking the difference of base period and observation period, the 
long-difference model efficiently solves the unobservable omitted variable problem in changes 
of private price. The hospital-specific fixed factors and other potential biases from uncontrolled 
hospital or market fixed effects are all differenced out in this way. The advantage of long 
difference model over fixed effect model is that this model gives more flexibility to control 
additional variables. Researches by difference model provide strong evidence of cost shifting 
(Morrisey 1994, Wu 2010, Frakt 2011). 
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3.2.2 Empirical Evidence of cost shifting 
During the past twenty years there has been a debate about whether hospitals actually do cost 
shifting in practice. It is believed that under cost-based reimbursement system, hospitals might 
easily pass through cost cut to private payers, however, some scholars doubted that hospitals 
could still do cost shifting under the current health care system and the increasingly competitive 
operation environment (Lee et al. 2003). Studies from the late 1970s to early 1980s found mixed 
results ( Morrisey 1994). During the 1990s, the market condition of hospitals has experienced 
dramatic changes. With the rising Managed Care penetration and the increasing market 
competition, it has become more difficult for cost shifting since their market power has been 
weakened (Morrisey 2003). Other researchers reviewing data from the same time period found 
that “without exception, for all hospital types during all time periods, lower Medicare prices 
were associated with statistically significant increases in private pay prices” (Zwansiger, 
Melnick, & Bamezai 2000). 
The controversy was intensified after Levit et al (2004) reported that private health care 
spending, especially in the hospital sector, had been growing rapidly since the late 1990s. This 
close timing association between growth of medical care spending and the BBA of 1997 has 
brought up hot discussion about whether hospitals engaged in cost shifting in responses to the 
payment cut of  the BBA of 1997. 
A. Positive Evidence of Cost-shifting 
Using hospital data from the 1979 AHA Reimbursement Survey, Sloan & Becker (1984) 
was the first to use multivariate methods to examine the cost-shifting hypothesis. This study 
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examined the impact of discounts and third-party reimbursement on hospital costs and 
profitability. They find that the cost-containment efforts of the dominant payers have reduced 
total payments to hospitals to some degrees, but a substantial amount of cost-shifting remains. 
However, Morrisey (1994) criticizes that Sloan & Becker’s research is purely cross-sectional in 
nature and any market-specific factors that enhance the hospital’s market power with local 
commercial payers will lead to higher private prices. Their findings are actually about price-
discrimination, rather than cost-shifting. 
Using a difference model, Dranove (1988) studies how the change in the private patient 
price varied together with the change of the profits from government reimbursement during 1981 
and 1982. Dranove (1988) finds that hospitals raised prices to partially offset government 
cutbacks. He estimates that a $1000 reduction in government revenue led to a $0.15 to $0.50 
increase in the average price per admission. Additionally, Dranove (1998)’s results lend strong 
support to a specification recognizing that hospitals with many private payers need not raise 
price as much in order to recover a given dollar loss   provides the strongest evidence of cost 
shifting .  
The majority of current empirical researches about cost shifting utilize the impacts from 
the implementation of Medicare Prospective Payment System. Rosenman et al (2000) has found 
that nonprofit hospitals tend to do more cost shifting when it suffered from a larger negative 
profit shock due to the price cut of Medicare PPS reimbursement. Using data from California for 
the period of 1983–1991, a time of increasingly intense price competition, Zwanziger et al 
(2000) finds that hospitals did increase their prices to private payers in response to reductions in 
Medicare rates. Hospital ownership and the competitiveness of the hospital market both affected 
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this behavior. Zwanziger and Bamezai (2006) further uses 1993–2001 data from private hospitals 
in California to investigate whether decreases in Medicare and Medicaid prices are associated 
with the increases in prices paid for privately insured patients. They find that a 1% decrease in 
the average Medicare price is associated with a 0.17% increase in the corresponding price paid 
by privately insured patients. Cost shifting from Medicare and Medicaid to private payers is 
estimated to account for 12.3% of the total increase in private payers’ prices from 1997 to 2001. 
Most recently, using Hospital Cost Report data, Wu (2010) conducts rigorous study to 
test the cost shifting hypothesis. She uses a long difference model to examine cost shifting in 
1990s due to the Medicare payment cut by BBA of 1997. In this study, she simulates a Medicare 
financial loss index to capture the exogenous impact by Medicare price cut in the BBA of 1997. 
She then uses this “BBA Bite” to instrument for actual change in Medicare revenue between 
1996 and 2000 and finds evidence that urban hospitals were able to shift a small part of the 
burden of Medicare payment reduction onto private payers. 
Apart from examining the average effect of cost shifting, Wu (2010) also analyzes the 
heterogeneity in the degree of cost shifting by testing hospital’s bargaining power and its 
interaction terms. Her empirical findings suggest that hospitals with various characteristics may 
have different ability to do cost shifting. Actually, the overall estimated degree of cost shifting 
may vary greatly according to the hospitals’ market power, which is measured by a hospital’s 
share of private patients among all patients. In hospitals with large share of private patients, up to 
37% of BBA cuts can be transferred through higher payments, while hospitals with large share of 
Medicare patients have no way to transfer the price cut to private patients. 
B. No/Small cost shifting evidence 
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Zukerman (1987) provides strong evidence that dynamic cost shifting is not a significant 
problem. He uses the financial stresses associated with Medicare's Prospective Payment System 
(PPS) for hospitals to test hospitals’ response. His identification strategy relied on the hypothesis 
that the hospitals with greater need to shift cost at the beginning of the period would increase 
their private price more. He found that limited amounts of cost-shifting occurred during the 
period from 1980 to 1982, and that the lower growth in Medicare payments has not resulted in 
cost-shifting on a widespread basis. Payment reduction of inpatient rate causes hospitals to 
contain costs, to seek greater outpatient revenues and to accept lower margins, however his 
results suggest that it is not the “need-to-cost-shift” that leads a hospital to raise its prices to 
commercially insured patients. Given the same need to cost shift, a hospital with 25% of 
commercially insured patient days actually reduced its commercial prices by 2.1%. Zuckerman 
(1987)’s finding supports the market power hypothesis that hospitals with larger share of 
privately insured patients have less power to raise the price upon a payment cut by a public payer. 
While providing strong evidence of hospitals’ cost shifting from the past, Dranove (1988) 
indicates that there are some market prerequisites for the existence of hospital cost shifting. In 
other words, in order to enable hospitals to do cost-shifting, patients should not be price-sensitive 
and hospitals have not charged the profit-maximizing price. Dranove predicts that when the 
market competition intensifies, hospitals will move closer to profit-maximizing prices and cost-
shifting will likely disappear. 
Cutler (1998) examines how reductions in hospital payments by Medicare affect hospital 
operations. He looks at two episodes of payment reductions: the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
He finds that in the 1980s hospitals could shift the Medicare payments cut by increasing prices to 
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private insurers on almost a one-dollar-to-one-dollar basis. However, in the 1990s, hospitals 
could no long do the same cost shifting as they did in the 1980s. With the growing role of 
managed care in private insurance during the 1990s, hospitals instead had to respond to the 
payments cut by cutting cost (reducing the number of beds and nurses) and sometimes by closing 
entirely. 
Dranove & White (1998) examine how private short-term hospitals in California with 
large Medicaid revenue shares would respond to substantial government reimbursement cutbacks 
during the period from 1983 to 1992. They compare changes in hospital net prices and service 
volume for Medicaid, Medicare, and privately insured patients. They find no direct empirical 
evidence of cost-shifting among Medicaid-dependent hospitals.  
Rosenman et al (2000) also found that the ability of a firm to obtain grants can influence 
a provider’s decision of engaging in cost shifting. They find that hospitals who obtain substantial 
amounts of government grants may use these resources to offset cost shifting.  
Wu (2010)’s empirical finding greatly stresses the heterogeneity of cost shifting among 
hospitals and suggests that hospitals serving disproportionate numbers of Medicare patients did 
limited cost shifting in response to BBA cuts. 
3.2.3 Indirect evidence of cost shifting and impacts on health outcome 
While a direct test of cost shifting looks at the effect of government price cut on the private 
patient prices, an indirect test of cost shifting looks at the effect of government price cut on the 
volume of medical service provided to eligible patients in the program and the effects of various 
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cuts by public payers (Morrisey 1994). Upon the financial pressures caused by a public payer’s 
price cut, a hospital may respond by both cost-shifting and cost-adjustment in various ways. 
 Hospitals’ non-price responses to financial shock 
Hospitals’ non-price responses to financial shock can be further categorized into 
quantitative and strategic responses. Quantitative responses include patient-selection, upcoding, 
reducing service volume to Medicare patients, cutting the cost by reducing health care input such 
as staffed-beds and staff number. Strategic responses may include switching patients to 
outpatient departments, which are not impacted by payment cuts. 
Hospital may shift less severely ill patients into outpatient care. As a result, the case-mix 
of average post-PPS patients may appear to be higher than before PPS implementation (Carter et 
al 1990, Russell and Manning 1989). Ellis and McGuire (1996) labeled this type of response to 
financial incentive as “selection effect”. Hospitals also may try to reduce underutilized fixed 
inputs at hospital level, for example, hospital beds, or reduce variable inputs such as hospital 
staffing (Cutler 1998, Wu & Shen 2011). 
Hospitals may change the service volume or intensity on the basis of patients’ insurance 
status. For patients who have less generously paid insurance (e.g. Medicare), hospitals may 
reduce the treatment intensity or discourage their visiting. A large volume of literature report that 
two-years after the imposition of PPS, Medicare’s average length of stay per discharge paid fell 
sharply and share of Medicare patient declined (Bazzoli et al 2004). Dranove and White (1998) 
find that service intensity levels fell for Medicaid (and Medicare) patients relative to those for 
privately insured patients after Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement cut.  
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There are a small number of literatures studying how service volume may change after 
the BBA of 1997 and the majority finds no significant evidence. Volpp et al (2005) finds no 
systematic pattern of different treatment or process-of-care measures for AMI patients among the 
insured and uninsured in high versus low BBA impact hospitals.  
Since hospitals have substantial control over the number and types of services available 
to the public, hospitals also may try to reduce potential loss by strategically expanding services 
that are not affected by the BBA. Since the BBA of 1997 has great impact on the Inpatient 
Prospective Payment System, but no changes on outpatient reimbursement system, hospitals may 
cost shifting between outpatient and inpatient departments by sending more patients to outpatient 
treatment if it can reduce potential loss (Leslie & Rosenheck 1999). Bazzoli et al (2004) find 
empirical evidence showing that during the study period of 1996-1999, outpatient services in 
hospitals facing greater potential financial loss from BBA expanded faster by 7 percentage points 
than those facing less financial potential loss from BBA. And for both types of hospitals, the 
growth rates of outpatient services far exceeded those of inpatient admissions and days. Friesner 
& Rosenman (2004) uses a panel of hospitals from Washington during 1994-1999 and finds 
some weak evidence that non-for-profit hospitals may practice cost shifting between inpatients 
and outpatients as well as between patients paid by government and by private payers. 
 Financial shock and health outcome 
When facing large exogenous financial pressures, hospitals may have to cut cost due to 
efficiency-enhancing constraints (Zwanziger et al 2000). Since average cost and quality are 
uniquely related in many cases in hospital industry, it has been widely concerned that price 
cutbacks in health care services and the following cost cutting may compromise quality to some 
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degree and have negative impact on patient outcomes, rather than only increases operational 
efficiency. 
There is a large body of empirical researches taking advantage of the price change by 
PPS to investigate the effect of exogenous financial shocks on quality of medical service. They 
have found evidence that financial shocks may negatively affect the health outcome of patients. 
Cutler (1998) found that changes in the PPS have a direct effect on the quality of care (measured 
by mortality), and the relationship is stronger for short-term mortality rates. Cutler (1998) 
examines how reductions in hospital payments by Medicare affect hospital operations and find 
that hospitals shifted financial loss from Medicare cutbacks in the 1980s to the private sector, 
however, hospitals had to cut cost to finance Medicare cutbacks in the 1990s due to the 
deceasing ability of hospitals to shift costs. His finding provides positive support to the 
theoretical model in Zwanziger et al (2000). Shen (2003) shows that a decrease in PPS 
reimbursement from 1985 to 1994 has adversely affected short-term health outcomes, but does 
not affect patient survival beyond one year after hospital admission. 
There is a small body of literature studying financial shock impacts on service quality and 
patients outcome due to the BBA of 1997. Most researchers find little or no evidence on health 
outcomes. Using 236,506 patients from the National Registry of Myocardial Infarction (NRMI) 
and Medicare Cost Reports from 1996 to 2001, Volpp et al (2005) finds that process-of-care 
measures for both insured and uninsured patients with AMI were not appreciably affected by the 
revenue reductions created by the BBA of 1997. Based on analyzing the mortality rates of 
patients with postoperative complications in Pennsylvania, Seshamani, Zhu and Volpp (2006) 
reports that BBA has negative impacts on health outcomes in the short term, but not in the long 
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term. Again using hospital discharge data in Pennsylvania from 1997 to 2001, Seshamani, 
Schwartz and Volpp ( 2006) reports that the increased financial strain from the BBA of 1997 has 
no significant adverse impact on patient mortality either among all patients or among the 
uninsured. Wu & Shen (2011) examine the BBA of 1997’s long-term impact on AMI mortality 
outcomes and find empirical evidence of negative impact in the longer period. They find that 
BBA payment cut has no significant impact on Medicare AMI mortality across hospitals through 
the study periods. However, when examining in the post-BBA period (2001-2005), empirical 
evidence controlling for the pre-BBA trends suggests that the mortality rate in hospitals suffering 
from larger payment has greater increases relative to that of hospitals facing smaller cuts. Wu & 
Shen (2011) also find association between the increased mortality rate of AMI patients and the 
reduction of operating cost in the hospitals with large BBA bites. 
  
45 
 
Chapter 4  Data 
There are three data sources for this study: Hospital Cost Report maintained by the Center for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council 
(PHC4) dataset and American Hospital Association (AHA) survey data. 
4.1 Datasets for cost shifting  
For the empirical tests of cost-shifting, I obtained the total number of Medicare patient discharge, 
inpatient revenue and other hospital financial information from Hospital Cost Report by CMS.16 
Additionally, hospital Case Mix Index (CMI) is obtained from the PPS Payment Impact Files 
maintained by CMS. The total hospital revenue includes revenues from general hospital inpatient 
routine care (SNF swing bed excluded) and inpatient intensive care. I also extract “hospital 
inpatient services under PPS” as the value of hospital PPS payment.  
Because BBA was passed in 1997 and came into implementation since fiscal year 1998, I 
use the cost report data for fiscal years 1996-2006. I include the data of 1996 in my research to 
compare how hospital’s strategies change after BBA. 
To receive reimbursement for health care services delivered to Medicare patients, 
Prospective Payment System (PPS) hospitals are required to submit an annual cost report in a 
standardized electronic format to Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services' (CMS). These 
                                                             
16  The data can be downloaded from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CostReports/CostReportsFY/list.asp. The 
documentation can be found from http://www.cms.gov/costreports/02_hospitalcostreport.asp (last access: Aug. 
11, 2010) 
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datasets are updated at the end of each calendar quarter and are available on the last day of the 
following month. 
CMS released Hospital 2552-96 Cost Report Data files for fiscal years 1996-2010. These 
data files contain the highest level of cost report status for cost reports. In other words, if both 
submitted report and final settled report for a hospital for a particular year are available in the 
Healthcare Cost Report Information System (HCRIS), the data files will only contain the final 
settled report. If both final settled report and reopened report are in HCRIS, the data files will 
only have the reopened report.17  
CMS receives comments from the public and other interested parties on Medicare 
operation and capital payments for hospitals. In May, CMS publishes its proposed updates in the 
Federal Register for public comment. In August, CMS publishes in the Federal Register its final 
updates which are effective in October in that year. 18 CMS maintains home pages of 2009-2011 
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment System (PPS) final rule, providing the downloadable 
files. However, for historical files of Final Rule during 1996-2006 are only available from GPO 
Access for the Federal Register at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/advanced.html. 
To estimate payment impacts of various policy changes on the IPPS proposed and 
finalized in the Federal Register, CMS also creates PPS Payment Impact Files, which are 
                                                             
17 HCRIS Production Notes For Hospital Cost Report Data: 
http://www.cms.gov/CostReports/Downloads/HospitalReadme09302009.pdf , last access at July 10, 2011.  
18 Final Rule home pages for 2009-2010FY can be accessed at 
https://www.cms.gov/AcuteInpatientPPS/IPPS2009/list.asp#TopOfPage, last access at July 10, 2011.   
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available from 1994 on. 19  PPS Impact Files contain hospital specific information, such as 
Medicare provider number, hospital’s name, geographic labor market area of the hospital, Wage 
index IME, DSH and Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA). 
The data of Standardized Labor Share and Standardized Non-Labor Share are from the 
Final Rule. The data are published in “Table 1a & National Adjusted Operating Standardized 
Amounts, Labor/Nonlabor” of the Final Rule. The data of Operating Wage Index, Operating 
IME Adjustment, Resident-to-bed Ratio, Operating DSH Adjustment Factor and Operating 
Outlier Percentage are extracted from PPS Payment Impact Files.  
I also extract the transfer-adjusted CMI from PPS Payment Impact Files 1996-2006. I use 
the transfer-adjusted CMI because transfer-adjusted CMI can better reflect the average level of 
actual patient severity in a hospital. Hospital characteristics data are obtained from American 
Hospital Association annual surveys. 
4.2 Datasets for health outcome 
The patient discharge data for identifying Hospital Acquired Infection (HAI) in this study are 
extracted from the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4) dataset from 
1994 to 2002. 
The PHC4 data contain all discharges from hospitals in the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania. The discharge information includes patient age, gender, race, zip code, region in 
Pennsylvania, diagnoses and procedures codes and discharge status. Especially, PHC4 data 
                                                             
19 CMS Impact Files are available from http://www.cms.gov/AcuteInpatientPPS/HIF/list.asp#TopOfPage.  
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contains the severity information in term of MediQual Atlas Admission Severity, which is a 
score of 0 to 4, describing the risk of in-hospital mortality as derived from 250 key clinical 
findings on admission, such as blood pressure, serum sodium, and hematocrit. This admission-
based severity index enables comparison of admission based risk adjusted outcomes. 
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Chapter 5 Empirical Evidence of Cost Shifting after the BBA of 1997 
In this chapter I discuss the empirical methods used to identify cost shifting effects and report the 
main findings. I first discuss the potential bias and endogenous problems that I may encounter in 
this empirical analysis. I then describe the methods and models used to help solve the problems. I 
describe in details how I construct an exogenous variable as the proxy of the BBA Financial 
Impact. I also discuss the advantages of long-difference model and how this model fits into this 
study. In the rest of this chapter, I report the findings of hospital cost shifting and how 
underlying financial health status may affect a hospital’s cost-shifting decision.  
5.1 Methods for Empirical Analysis 
5.1.1 Endogenous problems 
I assume that the basic model for private patient prices in the period t can be set as in 
Equation (5.11): 
Pit = αt + β Medicare priceit + δ Xit + σi + εit      (5.11) 
where Pit and Medicare priceit represent the price for private payers and the Medicare price at 
hospital i in year t, respectively. Xit and σi are hospital-specific observable and unobservable 
determinants of price for private payers, respectively. To simplify the discussion, I assume in 
(5.11) that both β and δ are constant over time. In other words, Medicare price and other hospital 
characteristics have constant impact on private prices over time. 
Endogenous problems will occur if one uses OLS to estimate equation (5.11). Firstly, 
there is measurement error in Medicare price, which may cause the coefficient estimates to be 
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biased toward zero (Greene 1993). The measurement error in this case means that the observed 
Medicare price or average revenue may not correctly represent the expected ones, because 
hospitals may change payer mix, engage in upcoding (Carter et al 1990), or change other input 
parameters in PPS price calculating formula to increase final Medicare revenues. 
Secondly, there may be some omitted variable bias in the estimation. Direct estimate of 
private price change leaves the hospital-specific unobservable factor (σi) into the error term. 
However, this factor may be correlated with both private price changes and Medicare service 
volume changes. In this case, an endogeneity problem occurs. For example, if a hospital has very 
good patient relationship skill that is valued by both Medicare patients and private patients, it 
may attract larger share of Medicare patients than other hospitals may do, and thus the private 
patient price in that hospital may be higher. 
Thirdly, there also exists endogeneity problem due to simultaneous changes of both 
Medicare and private prices. Given the association between a higher private price and a lower 
public price, the causal effect could be either from the private price or from the public price. As 
suggested in market power models, a higher private price could be set as hospital’s responses to 
a price cut by the public payer. At the same time, Glazer and McGuire (2002)’s strategic model 
suggests that a generous private price may cause a price cut by the public payer because a public 
payer can strategically set its prices very low to have a free ride. 
To solve the unobservable omitted variable problem and isolate the variations in private 
price change, I use long-difference model, which is discussed in detail in Section 5.2. To address 
the concern about simultaneous changes of Medicare price and private price, I construct an 
exogenous variable “BBA Financial Impact Index” to measure the potential financial loss caused 
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by the BBA of 1997. The impact index is then used as an exogenous proxy for actual changes in 
Medicare price and Medicare revenue received by hospitals. I will describe in Section 5.1.2. how 
to construct this impact index  
5.1.2 BBA Impact Index 
Based on a BBA impact simulator constructed by the AHA, I construct an exogenous 
BBA Financial Impact Index to measure the financial impact of BBA (reflecting BBRA’s 
amendment) on hospitals. The index is the difference between the simulated PPS price assuming 
no BBA impact and a Laspeyres PPS price. Because the Laspeyres price holds hospital behavior 
or operational variables fixed, 20  the BBA Financial Impact Index reflects the actual policy 
changes made by BBA only. This method is similar to those used in Cutler (1998), Shen (2003), 
and Wu (2010). The BBA Impact simulator constructed by AHA also summarized updating 
factors of PPS inpatient prices under different policy situations during the period from 1998 to 
2002. AHA simulator was also adopted in Volpp et al (2005) and Seshamani, Zhu and Volpp 
(2006) 
Assuming that there is no change in the PPS price formula or hospitals behavior, I 
simulate the expected PPS price. Assuming that there are no changes in hospitals’ policy changes 
or other behavioral strategy, I compute the Laspeyres PPS price index, which fixes input 
variables such as case-mix-index or bed-to-resident ratio as in the base year. When calculating 
                                                             
20 The behavior and operational variables included here are case-mix index (CMI), percentage of poor patients 
in the DSH adjustment formula, the residents-to-bed ratio in the IME adjustment, and the proportion of outlier 
cases. I will control for the major operational variables, such as CMI, hospital bed number and ownership in 
my empirical estimation model. 
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the Laspeyres PPS price index, I also incorporate the new price formula of PPS reimbursement 
under BBA. In this way, the expected financial loss index of BBA contains only the expected 
financial shocks to the hospitals as a result of the BBA policy change, therefore it is a valid 
exogenous variable of the financial impact of BBA. Specifically, I follow three steps as below to 
construct the BBA Impact Index. 
Step 1: I simulate a hypothetical PPS price in the absence of any policy change as shown 
in Equation (5.12) and Equation (5.13) below. If there were no any policy changes, PPS price 
will be updated each year by the full market basket. This means that the PPS price will increase 
by the annual inflation rate (the health care market basket index) (Cutler 1998, Shen 2003, Wu 
2010). 
Hypothetical PPS Price FY1998 = Actual PPS Price FY1997 × (1 + Market Basket Index FY1998)    (5.12) 
Hypothetical PPS Price FY t = Hypothetical PPS Price FY t-1 × (1 + Market Basket Index FY t)   (5.13) 
(t = 1999 ~ 2006) 
To generate a hypothetical PPS price for a hospital during each fiscal year from 1998 to 
2006, I set fiscal year 1997 as the base year, and multiply the actual PPS price of fiscal year 1997 
by the full market basket index of health care during 1998-2006. 
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Step 2: To estimate the mechanical effect of BBA, I construct Laspeyres PPS price index 
using the 1997 volumes of hospital production input variables, and update the base year price to 
2002, using factors reflecting actual policy changes made by both BBA97 and the BBRA99.21  
By holding the inputs constant, I assume that hospitals do not change their behaviors in 
response to any policy changes of BBA. I set the following input fixed in the base year FY1997: 
case-mix index (CMI), percentage of poor patients in the DSH adjustment formula, the residents-
to-bed ratio in the IME adjustment, and the proportion of outlier cases. 
Step 3: The mechanical effect of BBA’s impact can be estimated as the difference 
between the Laspeyres PPS price with BBA’s impact and the hypothetical PPS price without 
BBA’s impact, as shown in Equation (5.14). 
BBA Financial Impactt = Laspeyres PPS pricet_with BBA - Hypothetical PPS pricet_no BBA   (5.14) 
5.2 Empirical Model 
5.2.1 Long-difference model 
 Long-difference model in general 
Griliches and Hausman (1986) illustrate the derivation of Long-difference model in great 
detail. Under the assumption that the true model of estimation is equation (5.1), the long-
difference model does not utilize information from adjacent years in the panel data. Instead, it 
eliminates the state-specific fixed effects by differencing observations that are more than one 
                                                             
21 For example, the policy parameters of IME adjustment during FY2000 and FY2001 were initially set low by 
THE BBA OF 1997, but later adjusted up by BBRA99. 
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period apart. Taking the difference between the base period t and the study period j, a long 
difference mode can be written as 
Pij - Pit = (αj - αt) + β (Medicare priceij - Medicare priceit) + δ (Xij - Xit) + (εij - εit) (5.21) 
After setting Pij - Pit = ΔPij, equation (5.21) can be simplified as 
ΔPij = Δαj + β (ΔMedicare priceij) + β ΔXij + µij   (5.22) 
Because the correlation between two far apart periods is usually much smaller than that 
between two adjacent periods, the long-difference model is better in solving auto correlation 
problem of the error term than the first-difference model. Therefore, it is less inconsistent than 
the first-differences model (Griliches and Hausman 1986). By taking the differences in the 
observations that are less correlated with each other, the variance of the signal is increased 
relative to the noise in long-difference model. As long as the auto correlation between periods 
declines when the distance between two periods increases, the estimation of β in long-difference 
model converges to the cross-sectional result when the difference in the periods becomes longer.  
Assuming exogenous policy impacts and declining correlation between periods, Griliches 
and Hausman (1986) compare some general results of Long-difference model, Fixed-Effects 
model and First-Difference model. They summarize that for T>2, (a) the inconsistency of Fixed-
Effects and Long-difference is less than that of First-Difference model; (b) the inconsistency of 
the (T-1) Long-difference model estimator is less than that of the fixed-effects estimator; and (c) 
in the absence of measurement errors, fixed-effects and difference models are all consistent. 
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Long-difference model is adopted in cost shifting researches (Dranove 1988, Dranove & 
White 1998, Friesner & Rosenman 2002), as well as research on hospitals’ response to financial 
stress (Shen, 2003). 
 Long-difference model in this study 
While differencing out the unobservable omitted variables, the Long-difference model is 
also capable of eliminating hospital characteristics, if we assume that impacts of hospital 
characteristics are constant over time. In the reality, with the growth of managed care and 
implementation of the BBA of 1997, the operation environment of hospitals changed 
dramatically from the 1990s to the 2000’s and the impacts of hospital characteristics on private 
price may also change accordingly. To address this concern, in this study I model the impacts of 
time-variants on hospital characteristics. Another reason for this is to enable the including of  
time-invariant hospital characteristics and market dummies to control hospital and market 
specific shocks that may be correlated with both Medicare and private revenues. This model is 
also adopted in Wu (2010). 
The underlying model of private price now is assumed to be 
Pit = αt + β Medicare priceit + δt Xit + σi + εit   (5.23) 
The difference between equations (5.11) and (5.23) is that the δt in (5.23) allows time-
variant effects of hospitals characteristics on the private price. The long-difference model solves 
the unobservable omitted variable problem by taking into account the difference of the prices in 
Periods t and s. 
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Pis - Pit = (αs - αt) + β (Medicare priceis - Medicare priceit) + (δs Xis - δt Xit) + (εis - εit) (5.24) 
The terms (δs Xis - δt Xit) in Equation (5.24) for changes in hospital characteristics can be 
further decomposed as  
δs Xis - δt Xit = δs Xis - δs Xit + δs Xit - δt Xit = δs (Xis - Xit) + (δs - δt) Xit = δs ∆Xis + ∆δs Xit   (5.25) 
where δs measures the current effect of any change in hospital characteristics, while ∆δs 
represents the changing effect on the initial level of X. After Equation (5.25) is plugged into 
Equation (5.24), the final estimation equation can be simplified as  
∆Pis = ∆αs + β ∆ Medicare priceis + δs ∆Xis + ∆δs Xit + μis    (5.26) 
where t is the base year 1996 and s is any year during the period from 1998 to 2002. 
5.2.2 Variable specification 
Dependent variables 
Change of Private Patient Price 
Average private price in a year is calculated as total non-Medicare inpatient revenue 
divided by total non-Medicare inpatient discharges. Even though non-Medicare inpatients may 
also include Medicaid patients, I have to use non-Medicare inpatients as the closest estimation of 
private patients because CMS HCRIS data does not report revenues by Medicaid or other payers 
separately. I define the total net private inpatient revenue as the difference between the total net 
inpatient revenue and Medicare inpatient revenue. In the same way, the total private inpatient 
discharges are defined as the non-Medicare inpatient discharges, which are the difference 
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between total inpatient discharges and Medicare inpatient discharges. The total inpatient revenue 
and total discharges exclude both swing bed and Skilled Nursing Facility (SNF). 
The formula I use to calculate the private price is as below: 
Private price = 
                          
                           
=  
                                                  
                                    
 
When I calculate the variable using data from the Hospital Cost Report, I take the 
discount factor into consideration and the final formulas for calculating the private price 
technically are as follows: 
              =  
                        × (1 −         ) −                           
          ℎ     −              ℎ     
 
wherein,  
Total inpatient revenue = General inpatient routine care service (hospital) + Intensive care type 
inpatient hospital services + Ancillary Services, 
Discount = Contractual Allowances and Discounts/ Total Patient Revenue, 
and 
Medicare inpatient revenue = Medicare PPS total amount 
Independent variables 
BBA Financial Impact Index (BFI) 
I have price impact index and revenue impact index, two index variables to measure the 
BBA’s impacts. The price index constructed in Section 5.1.2 measures the average potential loss 
for each inpatient admission. BBA’s revenue impact index is constructed as the multiplication of 
the price index and the Medicare patient shares in a hospital. Since it takes the Medicare patient 
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shares into consideration, Revenue impact index can better reflect the final financial impact on a 
hospital. Negative sign of the coefficients of the Impact Index will indicate that a hospital sets 
the private price higher in face of an expected loss from the BBA of 1998. 
Hospital Bargaining Power 
I include hospital bargaining power to capture the price changes due to the hospital 
negotiating strength based on the proportion of private and Medicare patients. The Bargaining 
power is the difference between the private patient share and the Medicare patient share. A 
hospital with relatively higher Medicare share may be under greater financial pressure when 
Medicare cuts the payment rates, therefore this type of hospitals may have stronger incentive to 
shift cost. However, if Medicare patient share is high and the share of private patients is low, that 
hospital may not have many private patient chances to do cost-shifting. For this reason, I also 
include the interaction term of bargaining power and the BBA Financial Impact Indexes in my 
tests. 
Hospital Financial Ratios 
I use the debt and current ratios to measure the major features of a hospital’s financial 
distress conditions. Debt-Equity Ratio is often used to measure the leverage level of a regular 
company. It compares a company’s total liabilities to its total shareholders’ equity. In this study 
the debt ratio is defined as the ratio of the Total Liability to the Total Asset. It describes the 
capital structure of a hospital and is among the best measures of financial distress (Dafny 2005, 
Das 2009). 
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The current ratio is defined as current assets divided by current liabilities, where 
“current” means assets that are likely to be converted into cash within a year or liabilities that 
have to be paid in cash within a year. The ratio indicates the ability of a hospital to meet its 
short-term obligations with cash or other assets that can quickly be converted to cash (e.g. patient 
accounts receivable). Lower values suggest potential problems in meeting payroll or making 
payments to vendors. Most often, a current ratio of two (2) or higher is assumed to indicate that 
an organization is financially sound. Because of its definition, the current ratio is considered as a 
good measure of a company’s liquidity. 
Because of their definitions, the debt and current ratios may correlate with each other 
since they can also be interpreted as total debt ratio and short-term debt ratio, respectively. 
Therefore, I include only one of the financial ratios in the empirical estimation at one time. I use 
the debt ratio in the main regression, and use the current ratio for robustness tests. I expect that a 
hospital with greater financial distress pressure and larger BBA financial shock has a greater 
incentive to get engaged in cost shifting. 
Hospital Operational Characters 
I use Medicare Case-Mix-Index (CMI) and occupancy rate to measure hospital operation. 
Medicare CMI captures the variations due to the patient severity in each hospital. I use hospital’s 
Medicare CMI as a proxy for private patient CMI, which is not reported in HICRIS (Dafny 2009, 
Wu 2009). I use the occupancy rate that as a proxy of operational performance of the hospitals. 
Because hospitals may change the Medicare Case Mix and occupancy rate as a response to the 
Medicare price change, I fix both Medicare CMI and occupancy rate in 1996 level. 
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Hospital Institutional Characters 
I use dummy variables to indicate a hospital’s system membership and network 
participating status as indicated by the AHA. Burgess (2005) finds positive network effect on 
hospital pricing. Bazzoli et al (2000) finds that a hospital in highly centralized networks had 
better financial performance than those belonging to decentralized networks. Therefore, I also 
use a dummy variable to indicate whether a hospital is in a centralized network or not. 
I control hospital ownership types in the form of non-for-profit, for-profit and the 
government hospitals. The base group is for-profit hospital. I include dummy variables to 
indicate the teaching and the accreditation statuses22 respectively. 
The size of a hospital is controlled by using bed-size category variables. The base group 
includes small hospitals with fewer than 100 beds. Group 2 includes middle-size hospitals with 
beds from 100 to 299. Large hospitals have more than 300 beds. This sample includes hospitals 
from both urban and rural areas. Therefore, I use a dummy variable to control this feature. 
Hospital Market Competition 
Hospital market competition is measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which 
is calculated as the summation of market share squared. The market share is calculated using 
hospital bed numbers and the market is defined at the zip code level. Though HMO penetration 
is routinely controlled in past studies, I do not explicitly control HMO penetration in this study 
for two reasons. First, previous research shows that hospital cost shifting decision is not 
                                                             
22 The accreditation status is by Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO). 
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significantly affected by the HMO penetration or the change of HMO penetration (Wu 2010). 
Second, HMO penetration data are only at the MSA level. I will have to drop hospital 
observations from rural area to include HMO penetration information. Since the effects of HMO 
penetration are not the main variable in this study, I include county dummies to control 
geographical fixed effects, and the potential variation from the effect of HMO penetration will be 
controlled accordingly. Additionally, I include year dummies to control for year fixed effects and 
the base year is 1998. 
5.3 Sample Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I select from HICRIS database only general medical and surgical hospitals in the 50 US states 
according to AHA’s classification of hospital primary service. I use hospital observations during 
the period from 1996 to 2002 for which all variables are available from HICRIS, AHA and PPS 
Impact files. To calculate the changes of private price and other variables, I match the 
observations from 1996 with those in each year from 1998 to 2002. Because the revenue data in 
Medicare HCRIS database often contain extremely high and low values, the dependent variable, 
i.e., the change of private price that is constructed using hospital revenue from HCRIS database, 
is censored at the 5th and 95th percentile (Dafny 2009, Wu 2009). 
I exclude the hospitals with negative debt ratios. The negative debt ratios were generated 
due to negative total asset value or negative total liability value of hospitals. Most of them have 
negative total liability value, which indicates the capital lending activities, rather than the 
borrowing activities, in these hospitals. These capital-lending hospitals may have characteristics 
that are fundamentally different from the majority of the American hospitals, which are 
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borrowing capital for their operation. Based on this, One hundred and eighty hospitals with 
negative debt ratios are dropped from the sample. 
The final sample for this chapter includes 3696 hospital-year observations, having 683 to 
800 observations in a single year during 1998 to 2002. There are in total 928 unique hospital ID, 
among which 421 hospitals have five-year continuing observations, 245 have four-year 
observations, 135 have three-year, 79 have two-year and 48 have one-year observations. 
Table 5-1 shows the descriptive statistics of variables used in this study. There is no 
significant difference between the Medicare patient share in 1996 and 1998 to 2002. Hospital 
financial status did not change significantly over the research time. Debt ratio and current ratio 
almost remained the same. Comparing with those in 1996, the Transfer-Adjusted-Case-Mixed-
Index slightly increased by 0.026 point, while occupancy rate decreased by 3.5 percentage points 
and hospitals downsized by 11.3 beds or by 5.8% on average. Among the hospital institutional 
characteristics, the percentage of system hospital increased by 3 percentage points, network 
participating increased by about 1.7 percentage points, while the percentage of centralized 
hospital system, accreditation and teaching status decreased slightly. These small changes could 
be caused by hospital behavioral changes or reporting errors.  HHI shows that the hospital 
market structure during research period were stable. 
Figures 5-1 to 5-4 show the distribution of the change of private price, BBA Financial 
Impact Index (price/revenue) and the share of Medicare patients. The change of private price and 
the share of Medicare patients are close to normal distribution. The distribution BBA Financial 
Impact Index (price) is slightly skewed to the right due to a few observations of very large value, 
while the revenue cut impact’s distribution is very close to a normal distribution.  
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Figure 5-5 shows the trend of the BBA Financial Impacts and the change of private price. 
While the expected financial loss increases during the study period from 1998 to 2002, the 
change of private price also increases proportionally. The associations between the change of 
private price and the financial distress are not apparent as shown in Figure 5-6, while confirming 
the correlation between the debt ratio and the current ratio. 
5.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.4.1 Cost shifting in long run and short run 
My basic estimating equation is equation (5.26).  I first estimate the average cost shifting 
effects during 1998 to 2002. Table 5-2 reports the estimated coefficients of the BBA financial 
impacts on the change of private price. Columns (1) and (2) include the BBA financial price or 
revenue impact only. Column (1) indicates that for every one dollar of expected price cut by the 
BBA of 1997, hospitals on average increase the private price by about 77.8 cents. This estimated 
coefficient is very close to the result of 68.1 cents reported in Wu (2010). For a hospital at the 
mean with 43% of Medicare patient share, this estimate means a net gain of about 1 dollar per 
100 dollars BBA price cut.23 This means that for a hospital with average Medicare patient share, 
the revenue increase brought by a private price hike is just enough to offset the expected revenue 
loss caused by Medicare price cut. However, if the Medicare patient share increases slightly to 
45%, based on the same calculation, the hospital suffers from a net revenue loss of 2 dollars per 
100 dollars BBA price cut. 
                                                             
23 Given a BBA price cut of 100 dollars, the net gain of a hospital can be calculated as [-$100 × 43% + $77.8 × 
(1-43%) ≈ $1.35. 
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Column (2) suggests that for every one dollar of expected revenue loss due to Medicare 
price cut, a hospital has to increase the private price by about 2.78 dollars, which means that 
hospitals not only can compensate the expected loss due to BBA price cuts, but also can make 
extra money by lifting the private price. This result may suggest that the cost shifting effect in 
this model is over-estimated and there may be confounding factors. 
Columns (3) and (4) further include the expected price or revenue cut variable and their 
interaction terms with hospital bargaining power, as well as the bargaining power separately. In 
Column (3), the coefficient of the interaction between BBA Financial Impact (price) and 
Bargaining Power is not significant, while the coefficient of BBA Financial Impact (price) is 
very close to the estimate in Column (1). Column (4) reports that for every one dollar of 
expected revenue loss due to BBA, a hospital on average will increase the private patient price 
by 1.59 dollars plus an amount depending on the interaction effect of BBA Financial Impact 
(revenue) and bargaining power with private health insurance plans. The marginal effect 
estimated at the average payer mix of the sample suggests that during the period of 1998 to 2002 
for every dollar of BBA expected revenue loss, hospitals increase the private price by about two 
dollars.24 Meanwhile, the highest estimate of cost shifting in existing literature is 100% (Cutler 
1998).  
To have better understanding about how hospitals’ responses to BBA price cut change 
over time, I estimate the basic model using the subsample of each year from 1998 to 2002. The 
                                                             
24As from Table 5-2, the coefficient for BBA Financial Impact (Revenue) is (-1.592), and the coefficient for 
the interaction term is (-3.458). Given sample average Medicare patient share of 0.44, the bargaining power of 
0.12 (= 1-0.44-0.44), the change of private price at mean Medicare patient share can be calculated as $200.7 [= 
-$100*(-1.592) + (-$100)*(-3.458)*0.12]. 
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estimated coefficients are reported in Table 5-3. The equations in Panel A include BBA 
Financial Impact (Revenue) Index and those in Panel B include BBA Financial Impact (Price) 
Index. In Panel A the calculated marginal effects of cost-shift in 1998-2000 are reported on the 
bottom line of the table.25 The marginal effect of cost shifting in 1998 is 258%, which means that 
for every one dollar of expected revenue loss by BBA price cut in 1998, hospitals on average 
increase the shift about $2.58 to private patients. However, the cost shifting ratio decreases 
quickly to 121% in 1999 and further decreases to 45% in 2000. During the period 2001 to 2002, 
there is no significant evidence of cost-shifting. 
The results in Table 5-3 suggest that during the first two years after the BBA of 1997 
came into implementation, hospitals responded very strongly to the expected BBA’s price cut by 
increasing private patients’ price, however, in the long run hospitals adjusted their pricing 
strategies and largely absorbed the price cut. The change in cost-shifting degree with time could 
be explained by several reasons. First, after the earlier financial shocks due to the introduction of 
PPS system, hospitals might find it difficult to further absorb the price cut by the BBA of 1997 
soon after its implementation. Second, hospitals make price decision on the basis of ration 
expectation and the cost shifting in short run has incorporated expected price cut in future years. 
When the BBA of 1997 was enacted in 1997, hospitals had known that the price cutting would 
last from 1998 to 2002 and they might shift the expected financial loss according to the rational 
expectation with a long horizon rather than on a year-by-year basis. The cost-shifting effects 
disappeared after 2001 could due to the fact that 1999 BRRA and 2000 Benefits Improvement 
and Protection Act largely relaxed some BBA price cuts in 2001 and 2002. Given the relaxed 
                                                             
25The calculation of the marginal effects is the same as explained in Footnote 24 for Column (4) in Table 5-2. 
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BBA price cut, since hospitals already shifted the expected loss during the five-year period to 
private patients, there was no more cost shifting on average during 2001 and 2002.  
5.4.2 Cost shifting in financially distressed hospitals 
I further examine how hospital financial distress may affect hospital cost shifting 
decision. Table 5-4 reports the estimated cost shifting results, based on equation (5.23) while 
controlling financial distress variables of debt ratio and current ratio in 1996 respectively. 
Neither debt ratio nor current ratio’s coefficient is significant, which means that financial distress 
indicators don’t directly affect the change of private price. 
To test whether cost shifting varies with financial distress levels, I divide the sample into 
four subsamples according to four quartiles of debt ratio and run the same regression in Table 5-
4. Panel A of Table 5-5 reports the estimated cost shifting by debt ratio. Hospitals in the 1st and 
2nd quartile of debt ratio have low level of financial distress and their cost-shifting is not 
significant. For hospitals in the 3rd and 4th quartile of debt ratio, the financial distress is relatively 
severe and the coefficient of cost shifting term is significant. 
Panel B of Table 5-5 reports the results using current ratio to classify financial distress 
level. Since current ratio is the ratio of current asset to short term liability, the 1st quartile of 
current ratio means the lowest level of liquidity or the highest level of financial distress in short 
term, whereas the 4th quartile means the highest level of liquidity or the lowest level of financial 
distress in short term. Panel B shows that hospitals with higher short-term debt ratio tend to do 
more cost-shifting. The coefficients of the interaction term of BBA Financial Impact (Revenue) 
and Bargaining Power for the hospitals in the first three quartiles of current ratio are statistically 
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significant. However, the coefficients for the hospitals in the 4th quartile of current ratio are 
statistically insignificant. This means that hospitals which experience the highest liquidity and 
the least financial distress in short term did little cost shifting. The findings from tests using debt 
ratio are consistent with those obtained from using current ratio. 
I further use three-way interaction term to test how cost shifting varies with hospital 
financial distress status. I include the interaction between BBA Revenue Impact, bargaining 
power and a financial distress indicator (debt ratio or current ratio). The results are reported in 
Table 5-6. The coefficients of three-way interaction term for both debt ratio and current ratio are 
statistically significant. The three-way interaction term using debt ratio has negative sign, which 
means that the higher the debt ratio is, the larger the cost shifting is. When using the debt ratio, 
the coefficient of the three-way interaction term has largely absorbed the two-way interaction 
effect between BBA Revenue Impact and the bargaining power. As the result, the coefficient of 
the two-way interaction term is not statistically significant. In the case of current ratio, the three-
way interaction term has positive sign, which means that the higher the current ratio is, the less 
cost a hospital would shift to private patients. The coefficients of BBA revenue impact and its 
interaction term with bargaining power remain highly significant. 
As a sum, the findings in this study suggest that hospitals got involved in cost shifting as 
response to the price cut by the BBA of 1997 and the degree of cost shifting decreases quickly 
after the initial years. Further, hospitals with financial distress do more cost-shifting than those 
without financial distress.  
68 
 
Figure 5-1: Distribution of Change of Private Price 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Distribution of BBA Financial Impact (Price) 
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Figure 5-3: Distribution of BBA Financial Impact (Revenue) 
  
Figure 5-4: Distribution of Share of Medicare Patients 
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Figure 5-5: Time Series of BBA Impact and Private Price 
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Figure 5-6: Correlation between the Change of Private Price and the Financial Distress 
Status 
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Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics of Hospital and Market Characteristics 
Dependent Variable 
1998-2002 
 
1996 
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Change of Private Price 606.5 (1,267)   
 
 
BBA Financial Impact Index   
  
 
BBA Financial Impact (price) -456.3 (294.9)   
 
BBA Financial Impact (Revenue) -187.1 (100.8)   
 
BBA Financial Impact (price) * Bargaining Power -82.16 (167.9)   
 
BBA Financial Impact (Revenue)* Bargaining Power -21.96 (47.36)   
 
 
Hospital Bargaining Power   
  
 
Medicare Patient Share 0.433 (0.107)  0.437 (0.107) 
Bargain Power( private vs. Medicare) 0.133 (0.215)  0.127 (0.213) 
 
Hospital Financial Status   
  
 
Debt Ratio 0.474 (0.460)  0.474 (0.259) 
Current Ratio 2.519 (2.886)  2.486 (1.716) 
 
Hospital Operational Characteristics   
  
 
TACMI 1.320 (0.201)  1.294 (0.182) 
Occupancy 52.0% (0.159)  55.5% (0.161) 
Beds 184.8 (136.5)  196.3 (142.9) 
Bedsize group 1 (<100) 24.8% (0.432)   
 
Bedsize group 2 (100<299) 55.8% (0.497)   
 
Bedsize group 3 (300<) 19.4% (0.395  )   
 
 
Hospital Institutional Characters   
  
 
System Membership (=1) 47.8% (0.500)  44.8% (0.497 ) 
Network (=1) 32.7% (0.469)  30.9% (0.462  ) 
Centralized system (=1) 24.6% (0.431)  26.7% (0.442  ) 
In urban (=1) 67.6% (0.468)   
 
Accredited (=1) 93.8% (0.242)  94.7% (0.223  ) 
Teaching status (=1) 21.8% (0.413)  24.0% (0.427  ) 
 
Hospital Ownership   
  
 
Non-For-Profit 73.1% (0.444)   
 
For-Profit 12.4% (0.330)   
 
Government 14.5% (0.352)   
 
 
Market Competition   
  
 
HHI 0.952 (0.145)  0.959 (0.134) 
Change of HHI -0.007 (0.084)   
 
Observations 3,696 
 
  
 
Note: There are totally 928 unique hospital IDs in the sample, among which 421 hospital IDs have five-year 
continues observations, 245 IDs have four-year observation, 135 IDs have three-year, 79 IDs have two-year 
and 48 IDs have one-year observations. There are 683 hospital observations in 1998, 788 in year 1999, 802 in 
year 2000, 715 in year 2001 and 708 in year 2002.  
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Table 5-2: The Impact of BBA on Change of Private Price during 1998-2002 (Basic Model) 
Dep. Var. : change of private price (base year = 1996) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BBA Financial Impact (price) -0.778*** 
 
-0.711** 
 
 
[-5.166] 
 
[-2.564] 
 BBA Financial Impact (price) * Bargaining Power 
  
-0.584 
 
   
[-1.249] 
 BBA Financial Impact (Revenue) 
 
-2.779*** 
 
-1.592*** 
  
[-5.545] 
 
[-2.672] 
BBA Financial Impact (Revenue)* Bargaining 
Power 
   
-3.458*** 
    
[-2.815] 
Bargain Power( private vs. Medicare) 
  
-1,131.016*** -968.622*** 
   
[-4.214] [-3.343] 
System Membership -33.127 -47.781 -44.400 -46.704 
 
[-0.488] [-0.702] [-0.657] [-0.687] 
Network -105.496 -120.172* -108.906* -119.884* 
 
[-1.606] [-1.824] [-1.668] [-1.823] 
Centralized system 65.081 85.575 84.727 90.144 
 
[0.871] [1.153] [1.139] [1.212] 
Accredited 43.714 51.384 21.225 30.129 
 
[0.386] [0.448] [0.180] [0.256] 
Urban -208.059** -164.801** -97.458 -106.549 
 
[-2.546] [-2.047] [-1.158] [-1.268] 
Tacmi_1996 84.246 -13.662 125.987 126.586 
 
[0.349] [-0.055] [0.505] [0.501] 
NFP 2.924 -34.746 -42.536 -44.631 
 
[0.027] [-0.321] [-0.393] [-0.413] 
Gov 75.114 85.749 61.260 79.326 
 
[0.538] [0.614] [0.440] [0.568] 
Teaching 69.898 105.247 91.585 116.943 
 
[0.766] [1.162] [0.988] [1.259] 
Ocupancy_96 267.537 263.006 288.701 278.015 
 
[1.063] [1.049] [1.157] [1.108] 
Bedsize group 2 (100<299 ) -14.115 4.258 22.563 20.354 
 
[-0.162] [0.049] [0.258] [0.233] 
Bedsize group 3 (300< ) -154.994 -99.313 -83.039 -82.131 
 
[-1.174] [-0.755] [-0.632] [-0.621] 
HHI_1996 571.820** 542.870** 532.711** 545.747** 
 
[2.283] [2.134] [2.098] [2.143] 
Change of HHI 1,027.406*** 921.634** 900.560** 891.882** 
 
[2.814] [2.480] [2.396] [2.400] 
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 
R-squared 0.189 0.195 0.204 0.200 
Note: Standard errors are clustered by hospital. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. All regressions 
include year and county fixed effects.  *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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Table 5-3: The Impact of BBA on Change of Private Price Using Annual Subsample during 
1998-2002 
Dep. Var. : change of private price (base year = 1996) 
    
Panel A 
     
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BBA Financial Impact 
(Revenue) -5.873** -2.768* -1.477 -0.621 -0.950 
 
[-2.308] [-1.684] [-1.105] [-0.550] [-1.115] 
BBA Financial Impact 
(Revenue)* Bargaining Power -6.318 -0.780 -8.554*** -3.900 -2.263 
 
[-1.122] [-0.201] [-2.664] [-1.449] [-1.122] 
debt ratio_1996 -252.332 157.256 4.425 -296.515 -93.565 
 
[-1.195] [0.800] [0.022] [-1.506] [-0.440] 
Bargain Power 
(private vs. Medicare) -553.656 -439.705 -1,726.048** -1,103.075 -1,066.544* 
 
[-1.083] [-0.643] [-2.479] [-1.515] [-1.679] 
Observations 683 788 802 715 708 
R-squared 0.284 0.227 0.210 0.215 0.269 
Marginal Effect of cost shifting 258% 121% 45% 
   
 
Panel B 
     
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      BBA Financial Impact (price) -2.319* -0.921 -0.707 -0.084 -0.537 
 
[-1.714] [-1.416] [-1.204] [-0.165] [-1.392] 
BBA Financial Impact (price) * 
Bargaining Power -1.607 -0.851 -2.084* -1.780* -0.020 
 
[-0.657] [-0.715] [-1.890] [-1.850] [-0.028] 
Debt Ratio,1996 -290.794 129.434 -57.883 -350.421* -120.211 
 
[-1.382] [0.660] [-0.292] [-1.746] [-0.560] 
Bargain Power 
(private vs. Medicare) -1,020.460* -1,208.044** -1,898.340*** -1,626.472*** -953.413* 
 
[-1.893] [-2.419] [-3.339] [-2.790] [-1.802] 
Observations 683 788 802 715 708 
R-squared 0.289 0.232 0.220 0.223 0.269 
Note: All regressions include the same variables as in Table 5-2.  Standard errors are clustered by hospital. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 5-4: The Impact of BBA during 1998-2002 (Controlling For Financial Distress) 
Dep. Var.: change of private price (base year = 1996) 
   
 
Debt Ratio 1996 current ratio 1996 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BBA Financial Impact (price) -0.675** 
 
-0.683** 
 
 
[-2.443] 
 
[-2.461] 
 BBA Financial Impact (price) * 
Bargaining Power -0.679 
 
-0.651 
 
 
[-1.455] 
 
[-1.389] 
 BBA Financial Impact (Revenue) 
 
-1.502** 
 
-1.521** 
  
[-2.534] 
 
[-2.558] 
BBA Financial Impact (Revenue)* 
Bargaining Power 
 
-3.644*** 
 
-3.625*** 
  
[-2.989] 
 
[-2.970] 
Bargain Power (private vs. Medicare) -1,207.954*** -1,055.576*** -1,196.125*** -1,046.810*** 
 
[-4.648] [-3.758] [-4.578] [-3.714] 
Debt Ratio,1996 -104.578 -68.395 
  
 
[-0.783] [-0.517] 
  Current ratio, 1996 
  
32.029 31.920 
   
[1.609] [1.602] 
System Membership -50.074 -52.751 -47.559 -50.404 
 
[-0.745] [-0.780] [-0.710] [-0.748] 
Network -108.179* -119.011* -111.954* -123.095* 
 
[-1.656] [-1.809] [-1.716] [-1.873] 
Centralized system 92.271 97.077 97.157 103.019 
 
[1.232] [1.296] [1.293] [1.371] 
Accredited 9.720 20.386 6.644 15.169 
 
[0.083] [0.174] [0.056] [0.129] 
Tacmi_1996 71.850 77.949 73.353 71.751 
 
[0.286] [0.306] [0.294] [0.283] 
NFP -51.649 -50.445 -42.079 -44.320 
 
[-0.471] [-0.461] [-0.391] [-0.412] 
Gov 59.786 87.238 72.273 92.403 
 
[0.427] [0.622] [0.526] [0.670] 
Teaching 93.760 120.520 92.737 118.952 
 
[1.009] [1.295] [0.998] [1.278] 
Ocupancy_96 293.914 271.296 303.428 289.956 
 
[1.167] [1.071] [1.220] [1.159] 
Bedsize group 2 (100<299 ) 12.534 11.323 20.356 17.721 
 
[0.142] [0.129] [0.233] [0.202] 
Bedsize group 3 (300< ) -94.711 -92.879 -84.713 -84.548 
 
[-0.717] [-0.698] [-0.641] [-0.635] 
HHI_1996 544.628** 561.584** 555.519** 570.459** 
 
[2.157] [2.214] [2.194] [2.247] 
Change of HHI 884.117** 876.911** 830.966** 821.279** 
 
[2.334] [2.343] [2.176] [2.175] 
Observations 3,696 3,696 3,696 3,696 
R-squared 0.203 0.199 0.205 0.201 
Note: Standard errors are clustered by hospital. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. All regressions 
include year and county fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.    
76 
 
Table 5-5: Cost Shifting by Financial Distress Level 
Panel A: Financial distress measured by debt ratio 
  
 
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
     BBA Financial Impact (Revenue) -2.746 -1.108 -0.210 -1.927 
 
[-1.650] [-0.868] [-0.203] [-1.572] 
BBA Financial Impact (Revenue)* Bargaining 
Power -0.135 -0.296 -6.114** -3.858* 
 
[-0.049] [-0.110] [-2.101] [-1.674] 
Bargain Power (private vs. Medicare) -1,131.322** -711.024 -1,071.879 -936.437 
 
[-2.239] [-1.054] [-1.364] [-1.614] 
debt ratio_1996 -253.206 3,156.127* -2,259.798 700.907** 
 
[-0.234] [1.680] [-1.495] [2.380] 
Observations 927 925 923 921 
R-squared 0.440 0.356 0.344 0.363 
Marginal Effect of cost shifting 
  
41% 36% 
 
 
Panel B: Financial distress measured by current ratio 
  
 
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
     BBA Financial Impact (Revenue) -1.427 -0.756 -0.234 -2.108 
 
[-1.171] [-0.704] [-0.221] [-1.397] 
BBA Financial Impact (Revenue)* Bargaining 
Power -3.427* -4.128* -5.283** -0.489 
 
[-1.726] [-1.673] [-2.327] [-0.173] 
current ratio_1996 -456.932 -1,216.252** -2,699.268*** -886.451 
 
[-0.890] [-2.031] [-5.716] [-1.264] 
Bargain Power (private vs. Medicare) -171.093 -589.952 126.006 23.566 
 
[-0.804] [-1.496] [0.492] [0.738] 
Observations 924 928 923 921 
R-squared 0.316 0.430 0.426 0.379 
Note: Standard errors are clustered by hospital. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. All regressions 
include year and county fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5-6: Cost Shifting by Financial Distress (Interaction Effect) 
 
(1) (2) 
 
Debt Ratio 1996 Current Ratio 1996 
BBA Financial Impact (Revenue)* 
Bargaining Power* Debt Ratio 
-4.988**  
 [-2.189]  
BBA Financial Impact (Revenue)* 
Bargaining Power* Current Ratio 
 0.792** 
  [2.048] 
BBA Financial Impact (Revenue) -1.549*** -1.635*** 
 [-2.632] [-2.765] 
BBA Financial Impact (Revenue)*  
Bargaining Power 
-0.506 -5.042*** 
 [-0.283] [-3.381] 
Bargain Power (private vs. Medicare) -906.755*** -909.237*** 
 [-3.167] [-3.159] 
Debt Ratio,1996 -169.106  
 [-1.167]  
Current ratio, 1996  44.017** 
  [2.170] 
Totlevrg_96 -169.106  
 [-1.167]  
Curratio_96  44.017** 
  [2.170] 
HHI_96 539.473** 559.314** 
 [2.146] [2.218] 
Ch_HHI 880.280** 873.813** 
 [2.354] [2.332] 
yr2 22.598 12.418 
 [0.399] [0.219] 
yr3 107.268 91.561 
 [1.437] [1.219] 
yr4 225.793** 208.498** 
 [2.485] [2.285] 
yr5 565.089*** 544.879*** 
 [5.495] [5.283] 
Observations 3,696 3,696 
R-squared 0.202 0.204 
Note: Standard errors are clustered by hospital. Robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. All regressions 
include year and county fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 6 The Impact of the BBA of 1997 on Health Outcomes 
6.1 Introduction 
Most previous research uses the mortality of AMI patients to measure the impact of BBA on 
health outcomes. However, there are some potential problems in using the mortality of AMI 
patients to identify changes in health outcomes. First, there is selection bias in using mortality to 
measure hospital quality (Gowrisankaran 1998, Geweke et al 2003). Most statistics models 
assume random assignment of patients. However, patients or their physicians are likely to choose 
hospitals based on the factors such as location, convenience, and severity of illness. For instance, 
patients with high unobserved severity of illness select high quality hospitals; consequently 
observed mortality rates for high quality hospitals are higher. Geweke et al (2003) stresses that 
the problems remain even after controlling the observed measures of severity of illness. Second, 
the mortality of AMI is biased by “Window Dressing” effect. Because the mortality of AMI is an 
established indicator of the quality of health care and has received a lot of attentions from the 
public, hospitals may focus their resources on maintaining the quality of care for AMI patients, 
despite of reducing the service quality in other areas. Third, the quality of care measured by 
mortality rate does not capture the changes in the quality of life or in the quality that has not led 
to any changes in mortality. The effects of deteriorated service quality may vary from discomfort 
and extended length of stay to prolonged or permanent disability and death. However, the 
mortality rate captures only the death in severe cases. 
I use the hospital-acquired infection (HAI) rate to identify the changes in health service 
quality. The HAI is an infection that a patient contracts while hospitalized. I select the HAI rate 
to measure the hospital service quality for the following reasons. First, HAIs are a significant 
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cause of morbility and mortality in the United States. According to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (DCP)’s estimation, each year in the United States there are 1.7 million 
healthcare-associated infections, which cause about 99,000 deaths and additional healthcare cost 
from $35.7 to $45 billion annually (Klevens et al 2002). Now HAI has been treated as a priority 
within the health service.26 Second, HAI rate is regarded as a comprehensive index of health 
service quality. To prevent infection, hospitals are required to ensure systematical adoption of 
policy and procedures that reduce risk and enhance patient safety. Further, mandatory reporting 
of HAI rates was not enforced until 2005. The Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005 instructed 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) to identify at least two hospital-acquired 
conditions, which would be subject to performance-based payment. On the state level, 
Pennsylvania was one of the first states to mandate hospital-acquired infection reporting and 
began to release public reports on HAI data since 2005. Therefore, unlike the mortality of AMI 
patients, the HAI rates among hospitals in Pennsylvania during 1998-2002 are not subject to the 
“Window Dressing” effects. 
I use the occurrence rate of sepsis and pneumonia associated with invasive surgical 
procedures as a proxy of the HAI rate in this study. HAIs are often poorly identified in 
administrative records because based on diagnosis codes it is hard to distinguish HAIs from 
community acquired infection. Hospital acquired pneumonia is a serious infection that can set in 
if a disease-causing microbe gets into the lungs -- in some cases when a dirty ventilator tube is 
used. It occurs more often in patients who are using a respirator machine (also called a 
ventilator) to help them breathe and affects approximately 250,000 US hospitalizations each 
                                                             
26 http://www.cdc.gov/HAI/prevent/prevention.html 
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year.27 Sepsis is a severe illness in which the bloodstream is overwhelmed by bacteria. In most 
cases Sepsis results from infections such as primary bloodstream infections and surgical site 
infections. Sepsis affects 750 000 US hospitalizations yearly and approximately half of these 
cases may be hospital acquired (Eber et al 2010). Studies have shown that sepsis and pneumonia 
can reliably identify HAIs in administrative records (Martin et al 2003, Aronsky et al 2005). I 
narrow down to invasive surgical procedure only because these cases were unlikely to result 
from preexisting community acquired infection (Eber et al 2010). Further, surgical infection 
prevention is one important indicator of health care quality and patient safety. In 2004 the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) listed surgical infection 
prevention as one of the five major conditions to be disclosed publicly. 28  The Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) in 2007 selected surgical site infection as one of the two 
hospital-acquired infections 29 that are subject to performance-based payment. 
I categorize hospitals in Pennsylvania into three groups based on the level of financial 
impacts by the BBA of 1997. I continue to use the exogenous variable, BBA Financial Impact 
Index constructed in Chapter 5 to measure the financial stress due to the BBA of 1997 
(Seshamani, Schwartz & Volpp 2006, Wu & Shen 2011). This method is better than the one 
using operating margin or changes in net patient revenues (Bazzoli et al 2007, 2008) because 
                                                             
27 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001201/. 
28 In 2004, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) launched Quality 
Check (www.qualitycheck.org) to publicly report hospital-specific information about clinical performance in 
patient care for five major conditions: acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, pneumonia, pregnancy and 
related conditions, and surgical infection prevention. 
29 The other hospital-acquired infection is catheter associated urinary tract infection. 
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hospitals may change their behaviors to increase revenue and offset the expected loss due to 
exogenous financial shock, while the BBA Financial Impact Index as discussed in Chapter 5 is 
an exogenous measurement of financial shock and is not affected by the changes in hospital 
practices.  I used an average of BBA revenue impact during 1998 to 2002 to categorize hospitals 
into high-impact group (in the top quartile), middle-impact group (in the 2nd and 3rd quartile) 
and low-impact group (in the 4th quartile of BBA impact). 
6.2 Dataset 
I use the National Healthcare Safety Network list of operative procedures associated with 
substantial risk of infection to identify invasive surgical cases. I select the patients as those who 
had a DRG code indicating orthopedic or general surgical procedures, including Circulatory 
system, Neurosurgery, Orthopedic surgery, Endocrine system, Gastrointestinal system, 
Genitourinary system, Reproductive system, Respiratory system, Skin and soft tissue and Hemic 
and lymphatic system. Among the selected patients, I identify those who developed pneumonia 
or sepsis or both by checking the non-primary diagnosis codes. 
I use PHC4 inpatient data during 1994 to 2002. I include data from 1994 to 1996 as the 
base years before the enactment of the BBA of 1997. I include data up to 2002 for two reasons. 
The first reason is that 2002 is the last year when some of the BBA’s policies are still effective. 
Another reason is that new legal requirement regarding healthcare quality enacted after 2003. 
Since 2003, CMS has required hospitals to publicly report on performance measures endorsed by 
the National Quality Forum (NQF) and Hospital Quality Alliance (HQA) in order to obtain their 
full Medicare annual payment update. Especially, Act 14 of 2003 in Pennsylvania requires 
hospitals to collect, analyze and report HAI rates.  
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From PHC4 data of nine-year period, I initially identified from 196 general hospitals 
totally 2,498,311 surgical events, among which 25,425 cases are with HAIs. The average HAI 
rate during the study period is about 1.02%. About 80% of the infection cases are sepsis 
infections. I then aggregate the patient level data into hospital level and obtain hospital 
characteristics information and BBA financial impact information by linking to the BBA impact 
dataset in this study. I keep hospital observations without missing value. Because I need to use 
log transformation of the HAI rate, I deleted eight observations from one hospital, which 
reported zero HAI rate for the whole research period. I eventually have 706 observations at the 
hospital level during the study period, including in total 89 distinct hospital IDs. Since about half 
of the observations were dropped when merging with CMS dataset to obtain BBA impact 
information, I compare the main descriptive statistics of Pennsylvania hospital population with 
the final sample I have. 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The basic descriptive statistics of the full sample and subsample are reported in Table 6-1. The 
dependent variable, the HAI rate and all explanatory variables of the patient and hospitals 
characteristics, including MediQual Atlas Admission Severity, payer mix of patients and hospital 
ownership, in the full sample and the subsample, are not statistically significantly different. For 
this reason the subsample is a valid representative of the full sample, though the size of the 
subsample is only about half of the full sample. BBA financial impact is reported for the 
subsample only. 
The distribution of the HAI rate in histogram graph is reported in Figure 6-1A. Like most 
other health outcome variables, the distribution of HAI rate is truncated at zero and highly 
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skewed to the right. For this reason, I take the log of HAI. As shown in Figure 6-1B, the 
distribution of the log-transformed HAI rate is very close to normal distribution. Therefore it is 
valid to use the log transformation of HAI rate as the dependent variable of empirical estimation. 
6.4 Empirical methodology and models 
Basically, I use hospital-year fixed-effect models to examine the BBA’s impact on the HAI rates 
of hospitals. I first start from a model with year and BBA impact group interaction terms, which 
allow time-varying post-BBA effects. This model also allows a flexible investigation of whether 
there are any differential trends in the HAI rates between the BBA impact groups in any of the 
pre-BBA years. This method is similar with those in Acemoglu & Finkelstein (2008) and 
Seshamani, Zhu & Volpp (2006). 
Log(HAIit) = αi + λ X’it +Σt>1994 β1_t (Yeart*High_Impacti) + Σt>1994 β2_t (Yeart*Mid_Impacti) + Hospitali 
+ Yeart + μit         (6.1) 
where i indexes hospital, and t indexes year. Hospitali includes hospital fixed effect, while Yeart 
captures the year fixed effects. X’ is a sector of hospital characteristics. The dummy variable 
High-Impact indicates a hospital with BBA Impact Index in the top 25 percentile, while Mid-
Impact indicating one in the 25th to 75th percentile of BBA Impact Index. The base group is the 
hospitals in lower than 25 percentile. The coefficients of the interaction terms of year dummy 
and group dummy capture how the difference between the impact group and the base group 
changes between the base year of 1994 and a specific year. 
Then I investigate whether there is any common trend of the effect of BBA on the 
changes of HAI rates. I use ‘post’ to indicate the years after the implementation of BBA and 
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investigate the data using equation (6.2), in which years between 1998 and 2002 are defined as 
‘post-BBA’ period. The interaction between “High-impact” and “post” dummy identifies how 
the difference of HAI rates between hospitals of high BBA financial impact and of low impact 
changes during the period before-BBA and after-BBA. 
Log(HAIit) = αi + λ X’it + β1 (Post*High_Impact) + β2 (Post*Mid_Impact) + Hospitali + Yeart +μit   (6.2) 
Considering that my finding in Chapter 5 reports that hospitals actively engaged in cost-
shifting during the period of 1998 to 2000, whereas did not significantly shift costs during 2001 
to 2002, I further divide the post-BBA years into Short-Run-post BBA (1998-2000) and Long-
Run-post BBA (2001-2002). The estimation equation is specified as below. 
Log(HAIit) = αi + λ X’it + β1 (SR_post*High_Impact) + β2 (LR_post*High_Impact) + β3 
(SR_Post*Middle_Impact) + β4 (LR_Post*Middle_Impact) + Hospitali + Yeart +μit (6.3) 
Estimations (6.1) - (6.3) are the Difference-In-Difference models in essence. I did not 
include the main effect of period dummies and impact group dummies because the BBA impacts 
on HAI rates are identified by comparing changes in HAI rates across periods and across the 
BBA impact groups. The main effects of period dummies and impact group dummies do not vary 
over time for each hospital. 
In all estimations, the aggregated hospital level outcome measure is the log of HAI rate, 
using the surgical site sepsis and pneumonia rate as the proxy. Among the control variables on 
the right-hand side of the estimation equation, I use MediQual Atlas Admission Severity 
aggregated on hospital level to control for the patient severity in a specific hospital. MediQual 
Atlas Admission Severity is a score of 0 to 4. It measures the risk of in-hospital mortality based 
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on 250 key clinical indicators upon admission, such as blood pressure, serum sodium, and 
hematocrit. Because it is more likely for sicker patients to have HAI during their hospitalization, 
this admission-based severity index enables to compare risk adjusted outcomes. 
I include the length of stay to control for the unobservable patient severity, or underlying 
patient risks. The potential endogeneity between the HAI and the length of stay in hospitals is 
widely recognized in literature. While the risk of acquiring an infection increases with the length 
of hospital stay (Graves et al 2007, Delgado-Rodriguez et al 1990, Glynn et al 1997), the length 
of stay is further extended upon the occurrence of negative event HAI. 
With the endogenous problem, the estimated coefficient of length of stay is upward 
biased. Given the possibility of bias, in this study I include the length of stay for the following 
reasons. First, the time dependent feature is an important feature of HAI (De Angelis et al 2010). 
Risk of occurrence of HAI is increased every day when a patient stays longer in the hospital. The 
longer a patient is hospitalized, the higher the probability of using invasive medical devices, that 
lead to higher HAI. Second, the endogenous problem of the length of stay is not a major concern 
in this case. While length of stay for patients undergoing elective surgery varied according to the 
presence of HAI, the length of stay for patients with underlying medical illness or trauma is 
largely decided by the underlying severity of illness and patient characteristics (Olaechea et al 
2003). They also found that the effect of extra Intensive Care Unit infection did not contribute 
significantly when stays are longer than 21 days. 
I control payer mix by including the percentage of Medicare, Medicaid or private-
insurance patients. I also include the gender, age, race to control for patient characteristics. 
Among the hospital characteristics, I control hospital size by including bed-size group dummy 
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variables. I also include occupancy rates to control for actual use of beds. I control the hospital 
ownership by using a dummy for non-for-profit, where the base group is for-profit hospitals.30 I 
include dummies for teaching status, accreditation, and membership of hospital system or 
network, as well as urban or rural location. Hospital market competition is measured by 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is calculated by using hospitals’ bed number on 
actual zip code level. Additionally, I include eight Facility Region dummies to control for area 
fixed effects. The Facility Region is based on the Facility Region Code assigned by PHC4 and 
there are totally nine Facility Regions in Pennsylvania. 
6.5 Results 
Figure 6-2 shows the simple time-series average of HAI rates in hospitals with high BBA impact 
and those with low impact measured in terms of Medicare price change or Medicare revenue 
change. The top two graphs shows the trends of changes in HAI rates and log HAI rates when 
the impact measured by BBA price bite. There is no clear pattern for the changes between the 
high and low impact groups when the impact is measure by BBA price bite. The two graphs in 
the middle panel show the trends of changes in HAI rates and log HAI rates when the impact is 
measured by BBA revenue shock. The HAI rate in the High Impact group is on average higher 
than that in the Low Impact group. It appears that the HAI rates in both High and Low Impact 
groups lowered during 1998 and 1999. However, the rate in the High Impact group began to pick 
up again after 2000 while that in the Low Impact group showed a trend of going down. 
                                                             
30 The government hospitals in the full sample were dropped after merging with BBA financial impact data. In 
my final sample, there is no government hospital left. 
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The two graphs on the bottom level of Figure 6-2 show the trends of HAI rates between 
the financially distressed hospital (debt-ratio in the top quartile) and non-distressed hospitals 
(debt-ratio in the lowest quartile). In the graphs the HAI rate in distressed hospitals appears to 
remain on the high level after 1998 while the HAI rates in non-distressed hospitals tend to 
decrease, suggesting that the health outcomes in financially distressed hospitals may be subject 
to the financial impact by the BBA. 
However, the time-series trend is only suggestive, because it does not control other 
changes in the hospital sector or general factors in the economy. I formally control the hospital 
characteristics in regression models and exploit the variation of HAI rates across hospitals due to 
the impact of BBA. 
Table 6-2A reports the estimation of equation (6.1). I use years 1994, 1996 and 1998, 
respectively, as the base year in Columns (1) to (3), respectively. Table 6-2B reports the 
coefficients of the control variables. Except for the coefficient of (High impact * 1996) relative 
to 1994 being significant at the 10% level, none of the coefficients of (Impact group * year) is 
significant. Despite of the insignificance of the coefficients, the signs of the coefficients of (High 
impact * year) are all negative before 2002. However, it becomes positive in 2002. Although this 
insignificant estimation may only suggest the direction of the coefficients, these results imply 
that the HAI rates in high impact group might be insignificantly lower than those in the low 
impact group during the period of 1994 to 2001, however, the HAI rates among the High Impact 
hospitals becomes higher than those in the Low Impact hospitals in 2002. The estimation in 
Columns (2) and (3) using 1996 and 1998 as the base year, are insignificant again. However, the 
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coefficients of (High impact * year) in 2002 are positive and much higher than those in previous 
years.  
Table 6-3 reports the estimation of equation (6.2). Coefficients of the interaction term of 
impact group and post BBA captures the effect of BBA financial impact on HAI rate. Columns 
(1) and (2) report tests using 1994 as the base year. Columns (3) and (4) report tests using 1996, 
the year right before the BBA of 1997 as the base year. Because Figure 6-2 shows that the HAI 
rates in 2000 deviate from the general trend after 1997, Columns (2) and (4) omits the 
observations from 2000. Results in Table 6-3 shows that none of the coefficients on the BBA 
impact and their interactions to the post BBA period is statistically significantly different from 
zero. This implies that there is no statistically significant difference in the HAI rates for all 
hospitals on average after the implementation of BBA between 1998 and 2002. In other words, 
the HAI rate trends are statistically the same between pre-BBA and post-BBA periods across the 
three BBA financial impact categories. 
At the same time, given the statistical insignificance of the estimated coefficients, the 
sign of the coefficients may suggest the change directions of the HAI rates during the post-BBA 
period on average. All of the coefficients of Mid Impact * post are positive, suggesting that HAI 
rates in Mid Impact hospital groups are under pressure to compromise the quality. The 
coefficient of High Impact*post in Column (1) when including all years from 1994 to 2002 is 
negative, suggesting that the HAI rates in High Impact group may tend to be lower after the 
implementation of BBA. However, after I exclude the observations from year 2000, the sign 
becomes positive, though still insignificant. When I use shorter period to examine BBA’s impact 
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during the period of 1996 to 2002, the coefficients are still insignificant, but the signs are all 
positive and the value of the reported t-statistics increased by two to four times. 
Table 6-4 reports the short run and long run effects of BBA on HAI rate of hospital 
groups. Panel A reports results of estimations using BBA revenue shock to measure BBA’s 
impact and to categorize hospitals, while Panel B reports estimations using BBA price cut per 
inpatient admission as specification tests. In Panel A, Columns (1) to (3) report estimations using 
data from 1994 to 2002. Column (1) reports the results of the specification including only 
hospitals fixed effects, year dummies and the interaction terms of impact groups and Long Run  
or Short Run terms, without controlling other hospital characteristics. Columns (4) and (5) report 
the results from the period of 1996 to 2002. Again, Columns (3) and (5) omit the data in year 
2000. The results in Table 6-4 show that none of the coefficients of the BBA impact and their 
interactions to the post BBA period of short run or long run are statistically significantly 
different from zero. This implies that there is no statistically significant difference in the HAI 
rates for all hospitals on average after the implementation of BBA in the short run or long run 
compared to the pre-BBA trend. Again, the HAI rate trends are statistically the same between 
pre-BBA and short run or long run post-BBA periods across the three BBA financial impact 
categories.  
Though the sign of the interaction term of High Impact and Short Run remains negative 
when using data from 1994 to 2002, it becomes positive when using data from 1996 to 2002 after 
omitting year 2000.  The signs of the interaction term of High Impact and Long Run are positive 
in all specifications. The tests in Panel B of Table 6-4 using BBA price cut as BBA impact 
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measurement are consistent with the results using BBA revenue shock as BBA impact 
measurement. 
Table 6-5 reports the estimation of the effects of BBA on HAI rates in financially 
distressed hospitals. Panel A reports the effects on financially distressed hospitals and Panel B 
reports the effects on financially distressed hospital receiving high or mid level BBA impacts. 
Again, the coefficients are insignificant and the values of t-statistics are very low. In other words, 
after controlling common trends and patient risk factors, the HAI rates in those financially 
distressed hospitals are not significantly different from those non-distressed hospitals upon the 
implementation of the BBA of 1997. For the group of hospitals which are financially distressed 
and receive high or mid level of financial impact from BBA, their HAI rates are not significantly 
different from other hospitals after controlling common trends and patient risk factors. 
6.6 Discussion 
The results in this study suggest that after the implementation of the BBA of 1997 there is no 
significant change in the health outcomes measured by the HAI rate, which is specifically the 
occurrence rate of sepsis and pneumonia at surgical sites.  
Although I find no significant evidence about the association between the health outcome 
and hospital’s cost shifting strategy, the finding in this study suggests that hospitals may 
experience greater pressure of compromising HAI rate during post-BBA period, and the pressure 
may be weak during the short run period of 1998 to 2000, but became stronger three years after 
the implementation of the BBA. Wu & Shen (2011) find that the adverse effect of the BBA of 
1997 on AMI mortality only became measurable during the period of 2001 to 2005, about five 
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years later after the policy implementation. Especially, the adverse effect of the BBA of 1997 
became significant after 2003, which is the year that was not included in this study.31 In future 
research, I will control the HAI reporting factor and extend the study period to 2005. 
There is an association between the change of HAI rate and the timing of hospital cost-
shifting. It appears that hospitals actively use cost-shifting strategy during the period of 1998-
2000 soon after the BBA, the difference of HAI rates between high and low BBA impact groups 
tend to be smaller. On the other hand, when hospitals’ cost-shifting was less possible during the 
period of 2001 to 2002, it appears that hospitals were facing greater pressure of compromising 
HAI rates. This implication supports the theory that hospitals use cross-subsidization from 
private to Medicare patients to maintain medical care quality. 
There are several limitations to the analyses of outcome. Because this study sample only 
includes half of the hospitals in Pennsylvania, I will generalize the finding with caution. Even 
though the mean and distribution shape of HAI rates in the final sub sample are very similar with 
those in the full sample, there is no guarantee that the subsample has the same distribution of the 
population in all respects concerned. If the hospitals which were dropped due to missing value 
from the sample also experience great difficulty in managing health outcome, the estimated 
effects of BBA could be biased toward zero. 
Another limitation of this study is also related with the relative small sample size of the 
final sample. Small sample sizes lead to decreased precision, or large sample variance. The 
                                                             
31 As discussed in the introduction part of this study, I did not include 2003 because Pennsylvania began to 
establish mandatory HAI reporting policy, which may bring ‘Window effect’ or ‘disclosure effect’ to hospital 
behaviors. 
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estimated coefficients of BBA’s impact on HAI rates have positive signs but are insignificant. 
While it implies that BBA has no significant impact on the health outcome measured by HAI, 
insignificance of estimated coefficients could be due to the relatively small sample. Also because 
of the sample size problem, the observation identified for interaction effects are further restricted 
to small numbers. For example, there are actually only 23 observations in the category of 
“distressed hospital with high BBA impact”. 
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Figure 6-1A: Distribution of Hospital Acquired Infection Rate 
 
Figure 6-1B: Distribution of log of Hospital Acquired Infection Rate 
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Figure 6-2: Time Series of HAI Rates 
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Table 6-1: Descriptive Statistics of Patient and Hospital Characteristics 
 
Full Sample 
 
Subsample 
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Dependent variable 
     
 
Hospital Acquired Infection Rate 1.045% 0.76% 
 
1.043% 0.69% 
Patient Characteristics 
     
 
MediQual Atlas Admission Severity 0.956 0.232 
 
0.943 0.185 
 
Uninsured  1.8% 3.7% 
 
1.7% 4.2% 
 
Medicare share 42.1% 13.5% 
 
43.2% 11.2% 
 
Medicaid Share 9.1% 7.1% 
 
7.8% 5.4% 
 
Private Insurance 41.0% 13.4% 
 
41.3% 12.5% 
 
White 83.3% 26.9% 
 
86.0% 27.1% 
 
Black 6.3% 11.4% 
 
3.4% 6.3% 
 
Female 61.9% 8.9% 
 
62.6% 6.8% 
 
Age 56.6 8.4 
 
57.5 4.6 
 
Length of stay 5.4 1.2 
 
5.2 1.3 
Hospital Characteristics 
     
 
Non-For-Profit (1=yes) 99.0% 10.2% 
 
98.5% 12.2% 
 
For-Profit (1 = yes) 1.0% 10.2% 
 
1.5% 12.2% 
 
Hospital System Member (1 = yes) 46.5% 49.9% 
 
45.0% 49.8% 
 
Network (1=yes) 28.3% 45.0% 
 
29.0% 45.4% 
 
Bed numbers 216.2 152.6 
 
216.0 147.3 
 
Bedsize group 1 (<100)  18.1% 38.5% 
 
14.6% 35.3% 
 
Bedsize group 2 (100<299 ) 62.7% 48.4% 
 
66.7% 47.2% 
 
Bedsize group 3 (300< ) 19.2% 39.4% 
 
18.7% 39.0% 
 
Having HMO contracts (1 = yes) 75.2% 43.2% 
 
79.0% 40.8% 
 
HHI 0.962 0.129 
 
0.954 0.142 
 
Occupancy rate 56.4% 14.9% 
 
56.5% 14.6% 
 
Urban (1=yes) 77.8% 41.6% 
 
77.9% 41.6% 
 
Accred (1=yes) 89.3% 30.9% 
 
89.5% 30.6% 
 
Teaching (1=yes) 30.1% 45.9% 
 
26.7% 44.3% 
Financial Impact 
     
 
BBA Impact (price) ($ ) 
   
-453.9 286.0 
 
BBA Impact (revenue) ($) 
   
-180.0 85.3 
  Debt ratio 
   
0.489 0.334 
  Number of hospital observations 1541 
  
727 
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Table 6-2A: Changes of Average Difference of HAI Rate between Impact Groups 
Dependent Variable = log (HAI rate) 
    1994-2002 1996-2002 1998-2002 
  (1) (2) (3) 
High Impact*1995 -0.0238 
  
 
[-0.1538] 
  High Impact*1996 -0.3266* 
  
 
[-1.7187] 
  High Impact*1997 -0.0987 0.1840 
 
 
[-0.3736] [0.7962] 
 High Impact*1998 -0.2112 0.0793 
 
 
[-0.9564] [0.3753] 
 High Impact*1999 -0.1154 0.1469 -0.0299 
 
[-0.5878] [0.6981] [-0.1961] 
High Impact*2000 -0.3105 -0.0187 -0.1589 
 
[-1.2825] [-0.0771] [-0.6782] 
High Impact*2001 -0.1149 0.1750 0.0515 
 
[-0.4808] [0.6800] [0.2920] 
High Impact*2002 0.0597 0.3410 0.2182 
  [0.2221] [1.3099] [1.1065] 
Mid-Impact*1995 0.1180 
  
 
[0.7044] 
  Mid- Impact*1996 -0.2875 
  
 
[-1.3601] 
  Mid- Impact*1997 0.0228 0.2916 
 
 
[0.0835] [1.2348] 
 Mid- Impact*1998 -0.0414 0.2244 
 
 
[-0.1803] [1.0591] 
 Mid- Impact*1999 -0.0326 0.2219 -0.0843 
 
[-0.1513] [1.0963] [-0.4619] 
Mid- Impact*2000 -0.1185 0.1535 -0.1256 
 
[-0.4851] [0.6323] [-0.5293] 
Mid- Impact*2001 0.0313 0.2933 0.0054 
 
[0.1258] [1.1763] [0.0272] 
Mid- Impact*2002 0.1035 0.3537 0.1074 
 
[0.3982] [1.3997] [0.5927] 
Observations 706 554 401 
R-squared 0.545 0.606 0.688 
All regressions controlled for patient characteristics (gender, age, race, severity, length of stay and payer mix) 
and hospital characteristics (ownership, teaching status, accreditation, urban, occupancy rate, bedsize, HMO 
contract status and HHI). The coefficients of controlled variables are reported in Table 6-2b. 
All regressions included hospital fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
Robust t-statistics in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-2B: Yearly Changes of HAI Rate by Impact Groups (Control Variables) 
Dependent Variable = log (HAI rate) 
Control Variables 1994-2002 1996-2002 1998-2002 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Medicare share -0.1542 -0.1680 -0.8010* 
 
[-0.4357] [-0.4003] [-1.7680] 
Medicaid Share 0.1154 -0.0754 -2.3744 
 
[0.1094] [-0.0655] [-1.5560] 
Black 1.5350 1.1592 0.6927 
 
[1.3158] [1.0463] [0.6779] 
Female 1.5896* 2.4430** 1.9987* 
 
[1.9769] [2.6143] [1.7791] 
Age -0.0057 -0.0179 -0.0191 
 
[-0.2198] [-0.5805] [-0.5360] 
Length of stay 0.0522 0.0465 0.2819*** 
 
[1.4531] [1.3170] [2.6746] 
Admission Severity 1.2088* 1.9806*** 1.3891* 
 
[1.9282] [2.7278] [1.8006] 
Accreditation -0.0146 -0.1278 -0.1771 
 
[-0.1075] [-0.7036] [-0.7628] 
Teaching -0.0456 -0.1334 -0.1389 
 
[-0.3742] [-0.7859] [-0.6239] 
Hospital System Member -0.0264 0.0196 -0.0334 
 
[-0.3883] [0.2762] [-0.4274] 
Network 0.0069 0.0234 0.0953 
 
[0.1115] [0.3226] [0.9687] 
Having HMO contracts 0.0429 0.0727 0.0744 
 
[0.4875] [0.7709] [0.6943] 
Urban 0.1157 0.0388 -0.1650 
 
[0.4892] [0.1353] [-0.4080] 
Non-For-Profit -0.0290 -0.0467 -0.3170 
 
[-0.1303] [-0.1763] [-1.4739] 
Occupancy rate -0.1508 -0.0076 -0.3655 
 
[-0.3756] [-0.0177] [-0.8369] 
Bedsize group 2 (100<299) 0.4087 0.4218 0.3659 
 
[1.6103] [1.2649] [1.4787] 
Bedsize group 3 (300<) 0.3185 0.4140 0.4037 
 
[1.1690] [1.1758] [1.4816] 
HHI 0.0211 0.1273 -0.1047 
 
[0.1149] [0.6272] [-0.2657] 
Observations 706 554 401 
R-squared 0.545 0.606 0.688 
All regressions included region dummies, hospital fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
Robust t-statistics in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-3: BBA’s Impact on HAI Rate 
Dependent Variable = log(HAI rate) 
   
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1994-2002 1994-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 
 
omitting 2000 
 
omitting 2000 
High Impact* post -0.0279 0.0117 0.0525 0.0825 
 
[-0.2141] [0.0853] [0.3484] [0.5130] 
Mid Impact* post 0.0255 0.0429 0.1027 0.1019 
 
[0.1890] [0.3083] [0.6584] [0.6213] 
Observations 706 633 554 481 
R-squared 0.537 0.532 0.600 0.606 
Not reported here, but all regressions controlled for patient characteristics (gender, age, race, severity, length 
of stay and payer mix) and hospital characteristics (ownership, teaching status, accreditation, urban, occupancy 
rate, bedsize, HMO contract status and HHI). 
All regressions included hospital fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
Robust t-statistics in brackets. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-4: Short Run and Long Run Effects of BBA on HAI Rate 
Dependent Variable = log(HAI rate) 
 
Panel A: Impact groups are based on BBA revenue shock 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1994-2002 1994-2002 1994-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 
(no control var.) 
 
omit 2000 
 
omit 2000 
High Impact * Short Run -0.0527 -0.0973 -0.0431 -0.0183 0.0237 
 
[-0.3637] [-0.7305] [-0.3026] [-0.1133] [0.1365] 
Mid Impact *Short Run 0.0462 -0.0246 0.0015 0.0573 0.0665 
 
[0.3117] [-0.1735] [0.0096] [0.3445] [0.3756] 
High Impact * Long  Run 0.0998 0.0858 0.0757 0.1733 0.1540 
 
[0.5723] [0.5013] [0.4375] [0.9555] [0.8208] 
Mid Impact* Long  Run 0.1779 0.1053 0.0912 0.1814 0.1483 
 
[0.9838] [0.6215] [0.5357] [0.9874] [0.7851] 
Observations 706 706 633 554 481 
R-squared 0.538 0.504 0.533 0.602 0.607 
 
 
Panel B: Impact groups are based on BBA price cut 
   
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1994-2002 1994-2002 1996-2002 1996-2002 
 
 
omit 2000 
 
omit 2000 
 High Impact * Short Run -0.0002 0.0824 -0.0364 0.0441 
 
 
[-0.0010] [0.4694] [-0.2407] [0.2462] 
 Mid Impact *Short Run -0.0222 0.0860 -0.0413 0.0804 
 
 
[-0.1431] [0.4956] [-0.2607] [0.4566] 
 High Impact * Long  Run -0.1036 -0.0993 0.0013 0.0005 
 
 
[-0.5633] [-0.5282] [0.0067] [0.0025] 
 Mid Impact* Long  Run 0.1277 0.1292 0.2324 0.2231 
 
 
[0.6781] [0.6704] [1.1882] [1.1070] 
 Observations 706 633 554 481 
 R-squared 0.542 0.539 0.605 0.614 
 
Not reported here, but all regressions controlled for patient characteristics (gender, age, race, severity, length 
of stay and payer mix) and hospital characteristics (ownership, teaching status, accreditation, urban, occupancy 
rate, bedsize, HMO contract status and HHI). 
All regressions included hospital fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6-5: Effects of BBA on HAI Rate by Financial Status and BBA Impact Groups 
Dependent Variable = log (HAI rate) 
 
Panel A: Effects on financially distressed hospitals 
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1994-2002 1994-2002 1994-2002 1994-2000 1994-2000 
 omit1997 omit 1997, 2001  omit1997 
Disdressed*Post 0.0966 0.0496 0.0926 0.1561 0.1071 
 
[0.9566] [0.4271] [0.7958] [1.4961] [0.9100] 
Observations 706 629 542 531 454 
R-squared 0.538 0.549 0.560 0.560 0.574 
 
 
Panel B: Effects by financial status and BBA impact groups 
  
VARIABLES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1994-2002 omit 1997 & 2001 1994-2002 omit 1997 & 2001 
Distressed*High Impact * post -0.0628 -0.0268 
  
 
[0.135] [0.241] 
  Distressed*Mid Impact * post 0.0327 0.0432 
  
 
[0.174] [0.190] 
  Distressed*High Impact * early 
  
-0.0211 -0.0328 
  
[0.101] [0.177] 
Distressed*High Impact * late 
  
-0.1181 0.0004 
  
[0.238] [0.416] 
Distressed*Mid Impact * early 
  
-0.0255 -0.0354 
  
[0.173] [0.181] 
Distressed*Mid Impact * late 
  
0.1338 0.1960 
  
[0.203] [0.260] 
Observations 706 543 706 543 
R-squared 0.537 0.541 0.538 0.543 
Not reported here, but all regressions controlled for patient characteristics (gender, age, race, severity, length 
of stay and payer mix) and hospital characteristics (ownership, teaching status, accreditation, urban, occupancy 
rate, bedsize, HMO contract status and HHI). 
All regressions included hospital fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Chapter 7 Concluding Remarks 
Conclusion 
This study analyzed how private prices changed during the period of 1998 to 2002 relative to the 
base year of 1996 with respect to Medicare payment cut by the BBA of 1997. I found that during 
the period of 1996 to 2002, hospitals on average were able to shift the expected revenue loss of 
the BBA to private patients almost on a one-dollar-to-one-dollar basis. However, the hospitals 
did not shift the expected loss equally every year. It appears that hospitals shifted most cost 
during the first three years after the implementation of the BBA of 1997.  
There is statistically significant evidence that hospitals with financial distress do cost-
shifting. These results suggest that underlying hospital financial health status plays important 
role in cost shifting decision. 
I found that the BBA of 1997 had no significant impact on the health outcomes measured 
by the HAI rate, which is specifically the occurrence rate of sepsis and pneumonia at surgical 
sites. I found no statistically significant evidence about the association between the health 
outcomes and hospital’s cost shifting strategy. However, the empirical results suggest that 
hospitals may experience greater pressure of compromising HAI rate during the post-BBA 
period, and the pressure seems weaker when hospitals were shifting cost, whereas stronger when 
hospitals did not significantly shift cost. 
  
102 
 
Limitation 
One limitation of the cost shifting in this study is that the price changes do not reflect potential 
quality changes. Healthcare quality is not directly measured and controlled in the estimation. 
Facing payment cut by Medicare, hospitals may cut cost by cutting staff numbers and/or 
adopting new technologies. Hospitals may also shift patients between inpatient and outpatient 
departments, which are not subject to the impact of the BBA of 1997. In my future research, I 
will further examine hospitals’ cost shifting with the controls of quality measurement, 
technology changes and labor input of health care givers. 
Although I find highly significant evidence of hospital cost shifting in this study, I will 
further explore to obtain a more feasible estimation of cost shifting effect in future research. I 
will examine whether there are other time variant confounding factors of private patient price 
change, which may lead to an overestimated efficient of BBA Financial Impact. I will also try IV 
method to better address the concern that Medicare price or revenue may be correlated with 
changes in private price. 
Another future research direction of this study is to examine the association between the 
hospital investment cuts due to the BBA of 1997 and possible negative patient outcomes during 
longer period. Increased financial pressures might lead to cutbacks in hospital plants and 
equipment investments as suggested in Bazzoli et al (2007). Thus, the negative impacts may 
show up during even longer period, despite that this study does not find significant negative 
impacts on the health outcomes. 
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